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GEOGRAPHIC TRADEMARKS 
AND THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITOR 
COMMUNICATION∗ 
By Robert Brauneis∗∗ and Roger E. Schechter∗∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the U.S. Supreme Court observed over a century ago, 
“[n]othing is more common than that a manufacturer sends his 
products to market, designating them by the name of the place 
where they were made.”1 What was true then seems even more 
true today. Many merchants use geographic names or “toponyms”2 
to brand their goods, either using “the name of the place where 
they were made” or using some other place name that they think 
will catch consumers’ attention. From the TOYOTA TACOMA to 
KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN,3 brand names derived from 
toponyms are thick on the ground. 
The most common issue regarding trademark protection for 
such brand names under U.S. law has traditionally been whether 
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 1. Canal Co. v. Clarke, 80 U.S. 311, 325, 20 L. Ed. 581 (1872).  
 2. A toponym is simply “a name of a place.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of 
the English Language 2670 (2d ed. 1947). We will use terms such as “geographic term,” 
“place name,” “geographical designation,” and “toponym” interchangeably to refer to all 
designations of particular places, whether those designations are words, as most are, or are 
nonverbal symbols or designs. We say “particular place” because we mean to exclude terms 
referring to types of geographic features, such as “bay” or “archipelago”; but we mean to 
include places of all sizes, from a single street, such as Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills, 
California, to an entire continent or ocean, such as South America or the Indian Ocean. 
 3. Or, for that matter Tennessee, Ohio, Mississippi, New Jersey, Louisiana, Kansas, 
Arizona, California, Maryland, Florida, Arkansas, Georgia, or Utah Fried Chicken, all of 
which apparently exist in the metropolitan New York City area. See 
http://www.satanslaundromat.com/sl/archives/000452.html (visited December 2, 2005).  
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protection is available immediately upon use, or must await proof 
that the brand names have gained “secondary meaning”4 among 
consumers. True, a small number of geographic terms are 
incorporated into generic names for types of goods or services—
think brussels sprouts or swedish massage—and under traditional 
trademark doctrine these can never be protected as trademarks for 
those goods or services. Another small number of brand names 
containing geographic terms are found to provide deceptive 
information to consumers, and are denied protection for that 
reason regardless of whether they have obtained secondary 
meaning. 
However, for the vast majority of geographic brand names, the 
crucial issues for trademark protection are whether a 
demonstration of secondary meaning will be required, and if so 
how and when that demonstration can be made. The traditional 
common-law approach has been to require the demonstration of 
secondary meaning for virtually all trademarks consisting of 
geographic terms. The refusal to grant trademark protection to 
geographic terms immediately upon first use has largely been 
grounded upon uncertainty about whether competitors might also 
need to use such terms to describe their own goods or services. Of 
course, the competitors are envisioned to be making these 
descriptions as part of commercial communications to consumers, 
and the ultimate goal is to benefit consumers as well as producers 
by facilitating those commercial communications. The secondary 
meaning requirement subjects geographic terms to a “market test” 
of that competitor need, since substantial use of the terms by 
competitors will prevent secondary meaning from ever arising.  
A separate but related issue is whether brand names 
containing or consisting of toponyms can be registered under 
federal law. Under the dominant interpretation of the Trademark 
Act of 1905, no brand name that consisted of a geographic term 
could ever be registered as a trademark, no matter how remote 
and obscure the place, on the ground that all place names should 
remain available for use by all competitors.5 The Lanham Act of 
1946, however, made eligibility for federal registration track the 
eligibility requirements for common-law protection, by requiring 
secondary meaning to register marks that were “primarily 
geographically descriptive” or “primarily geographically 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. See, e.g., Two Pesos. Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“Marks 
which are merely descriptive of a product . . . do not inherently identify a particular source, 
and hence cannot be protected. However, descriptive marks may acquire the distinctiveness 
which will allow them to be protected under the [Lanham] Act. . . . This acquired 
distinctiveness is generally called ‘secondary meaning.’”).  
 5. The history summarized in the next three paragraphs is recounted below in greater 
detail and with citations. See infra Part II.  
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deceptively misdescriptive.” For the first several decades of the 
Lanham Act’s administration, those provisions were usually 
interpreted to require secondary meaning for all trademarks 
containing terms recognized by the American public as geographic, 
just as the common law did. 
Thus, for a period of about 35 years beginning in 1946, the 
common law of trademark protection and the federal law of 
trademark registration shared three key features in their 
approaches to geographic marks: a reluctance to protect 
geographic marks immediately; a focus on supporting commercial 
communication when determining whether and when protection 
was available; and use of the secondary meaning requirement as a 
market test for whether competitors needed the term to engage in 
such communication. 
More recently, however, there has been a marked shift away 
from all three of those key features. A little over two decades ago, 
courts began to develop a “goods-place association” test that made 
it more difficult for trademark examiners to deny applications for 
immediate registration of a geographic mark, and that focused 
attention on subjective consumer perception of geographic terms 
rather than the needs of competitors. About ten years later, 
Congress drastically reduced the use of the secondary meaning 
requirement. Ostensibly acting to fulfill the United States’s 
obligations under two international treaties—the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)—Congress 
provided that “primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive” marks, which were previously registrable upon 
proof of secondary meaning, could never be registered. In 2003, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that marks were 
only “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” when 
the misdescription materially affected consumer purchasing 
decisions. That holding focused the geographic mark inquiry even 
more narrowly on consumer protection from fraud rather than 
competition-promoting commercial communication, and 
substantially enlarged the category of geographic brand names 
eligible for immediate trademark protection. Finally, another 2003 
decision of the Federal Circuit distinguished goods from services 
and created even higher standards for demonstrating a “service-
place” association, making more geographic brand names for 
services eligible for immediate trademark protection.  
In this article, we defend all three key features of the shared 
mid-century approach to trademark protection for geographic 
terms, and challenge the developments that have diminished their 
influence in trademark law. Those developments were initially 
changes in judicial perspectives, but also came to include federal 
legislation and international treaties, so although our critical gaze 
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will begin with courts, it will eventually reach Congress and the 
international community. 
We argue that the “goods-place association” test’s reliance on 
current subjective consumer understanding is misplaced, because 
consumer understandings of most geographic term uses are 
uncertain and unstable. Because of that uncertainty and 
instability, the important question to ask is whether there may be 
legitimate commercial communication that would be burdened by 
granting trademark rights to a given geographic term. Such a 
burden is possible whenever there are competitors located in the 
place named by the geographic term. If there are, then the term 
should be granted trademark protection and registered only after a 
demonstration of secondary meaning, because the secondary 
meaning requirement provides an important safeguard of equal 
access to the necessities of commercial communication. We also 
argue that NAFTA and TRIPS did not require Congress to 
eliminate the role of secondary meaning in determining whether a 
large category of geographic marks can be registered, and we 
suggest the outlines of legal provisions that would comply with 
NAFTA and TRIPS while restoring an intermediate category of 
marks registrable upon proof of secondary meaning.  
Our organization is straightforward. In Part II, we review the 
historical development of the rules governing the protection and 
registration of geographic marks. In Part III, we evaluate judicial 
interpretation of the Lanham Act as it existed between 1946 and 
1993. We criticize the goods-place association test and the 
subjective approach that it exemplifies, and advocate the addition 
of an objective component to that approach to better protect the 
interests of competitors in communicating with consumers. 
Finally, in Part IV, we consider the 1993 NAFTA Implementation 
Act, and the state of geographic trademark policy in its wake.  
II. HOW WE GOT WHERE WE ARE 
The historical evolution of the rules governing federal 
registration of geographic trademarks has been traced elsewhere.6 
Thus, the reader familiar with this history may wish to proceed at 
once to the following sections. For those unfamiliar with the 
background, however, a concise version will help to put our 
critique into a proper context. By our count, the history has five 
significant eras, covering, respectively, the first federal trademark 
statute, in force from 1905 to 1946; the original Lanham Act 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, Innovations Palpitations: The Confusing Status of 
Geographically Misdescriptive Trademarks, 12 J. Intel. Prop. L. 125 (2004) [hereinafter 
LaFrance]; 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 14:26-14:33 (4th 
ed. 2005). 
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approach, from 1947 to 1982; the initial period following the 
decision in In re Nantucket,7 from 1983 to 1992; the decade 
following the adoption of the NAFTA amendments, from 1993 to 
2002; and the current state of the law after the 2003 decisions in 
In re California Innovations, Inc.8 and In re Les Halles de Paris, 
J.V.9 
A. 1905 to 1946: Pre-Lanham Act Doctrine 
Concerning Geographic Marks 
Congress adopted the first effective federal trademark statute 
in 1905.10 Under Section 5(b) of that statute, it was impermissible 
to register any purported trademark that was “merely a 
geographic name or term.”11 The predominant view was that the 
function of the term “merely” was to indicate that the 1905 Act 
prohibited registration of marks consisting solely of geographic 
terms,12 and did not necessarily prohibit composite marks of which 
geographic terms were only a part.13 The test for determining 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 8. 329 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 9. 334 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 10. 33 Stat. 724 (1905). Congress enacted the first federal trademark statute in 1870, 
but that statute was not limited to marks being used in interstate commerce. Shortly 
thereafter the Supreme Court held that law unconstitutional, finding that it could not be 
sustained under the Congressional authority in the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). Although Congress passed a new 
trademark law in 1881, it was limited to the registration of marks used in foreign 
commerce. It was only with the 1905 enactment that Congress provided a registration 
scheme for marks being used in domestic interstate commerce. 
 11. 33 Stat. 724 at § 5(b). Interestingly, the British trademark statute passed the very 
same year did allow for registration of geographic terms upon proof of secondary meaning. 
See Trade Marks Act 1905, 5 Edw 7, ch 15, § 9 (5). 
 12. In at least one case, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that a word was 
not “merely a geographic name” if it had other connotations, either connotations that 
existed independently of the applicant’s use, or those acquired as a secondary meaning 
through the applicant’s use. See In re Plymouth Motor Corporation, 46 F.2d 211 (C.C.P.A. 
1931) (holding that the Plymouth Motor Corporation did not have to disclaim the word 
“Plymouth” when seeking to register a composite mark comprising a picture of a sailing 
vessel on the sea and the words “Chrysler Plymouth”). The Plymouth Motor Corporation 
court cited the applicant’s contentions that “the word ‘Plymouth’ . . . is associated in popular 
thought with the landing in America of the group known as ‘Pilgrims’; that the word brings 
to mind certain qualities of ‘endurance,’ ‘strength,’ ‘honesty,’ and ‘determination.’” Id. at 
212. However, this was clearly the minority view. See, e.g. , In re Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 
Inc., 86 F.2d 830 (C.C.P.A. 1936) (holding that a map of Canada, adjudged to be equivalent 
to the word “Canada,” could not be registered regardless of whether it had acquired 
secondary meaning through long exclusive use); Ex parte Hettrick Manufacturing Company, 
32 U.S.P.Q. 164 (Comm’r Pats. 1937) (suggesting that In re Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc. 
overruled In re Plymouth Motor Corporation).  
 13. We cite a number of examples below in notes 17 to 23. See also Estate of P.D. 
Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 544-46 (1920) (holding that 
although the words “Moistair Heating System” would by themselves be merely descriptive 
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whether a particular term was a geographic term was 
extraordinarily broad. Registration would be denied even if a term 
had multiple meanings so long as there was one meaning that was 
geographic, and regardless of whether a non-geographic meaning 
might be dominant.14 Moreover, even if the place named was 
obscure, or indeed entirely unknown to American consumers, the 
provision barring registration was considered applicable.15  
If nothing else, this approach had a considerable degree of 
administrative simplicity to commend it. The examiner reviewing 
the application needed only check to see if the term in question 
was listed in an atlas or other geographic source, and if the 
examiner found any place in the world bearing the name in 
question, that was the end of the matter. Registration was denied. 
This approach was also consistent with the overall scheme of 
the 1905 Act. That statute only allowed registration of marks that 
were, in contemporary parlance, inherently distinctive. Marks 
requiring secondary meaning for common-law protection—known 
at the time as “trade names”—were not registrable. In other 
words, all descriptive marks were ineligible for federal protection 
at this time regardless of their length of use or their degree of 
consumer recognition.16 Since it had always been thought that 
geographic marks required secondary meaning for protection, the 
absolute ban on their registration under the 1905 Act was hardly 
surprising. 
                                                                                                                                         
 
and thus not registrable under § 5(b) of the 1905 Act, the words in combination with other 
words and a design were registrable; the Commissioner of Patents could require a 
disclaimer as to the merely descriptive words, but could not require their elimination from 
the mark). 
 14. See, e.g., Ex parte Hettrick Manufacturing Company, 32 U.S.P.Q. 164 (Comm’r 
Pats. 1937) (EDGEWOOD not registrable for furniture because the statute “leaves no room 
for exception, but forbids registration of all geographical terms, including those with 
alternative meanings, one of which may be non-geographical.”); Ex parte Grommes & 
Ullrich, Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q. 152 (Comm’r Pats. 1935) (MARQUETTE not registrable for 
whiskey because “where a notation has two meanings, one of which is geographical and the 
other of which is not, it must nevertheless be refused registration.”). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, 49 U.S.P.Q. 650 (C.C.P.A. 1941) 
(the mark CHANTELLE for cheese held unregistrable under the 1905 Act because it is the 
name of a town in France, and “the fact that the town is little known in this country does 
not change the situation.”); In re Westgate Sea Products Company, 69 U.S.P.Q. 438 (C.C.P.A. 
1946) (the mark WESTGATE for canned fish held unregistrable under the 1905 Act because 
it is the name of two small midwestern towns, even though they are “inconsequential 
towns.”). 
 16. See generally 4A Louis Altman, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks, and 
Monopolies § 26:19 (4th ed. 1981). The 1905 Act did provide that marks that had been used 
exclusively for ten years prior to its effective date—that is, since 1895—would be eligible for 
protection. This could be characterized as a conclusive presumption of secondary meaning 
for such marks, although the statute did not use that terminology. Id. Many trademarks 
incorporating geographic terms were registered under this provision. See, e.g., U.S. 
Trademark Registration No. 0064125 for BUDWEISER for beer, which issued July 23, 1907. 
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Moreover, the rule of the 1905 Act was not as severe as it 
might first appear. First, courts recognized that not all composite 
marks containing geographic terms conveyed a geographic 
meaning. Thus, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
registered mark the AMERICAN GIRL for shoes was not 
geographically descriptive, because “it does not signify that the 
shoes are manufactured in America, or intended to be sold or used 
in America.”17 Even if the geographic term in a composite mark 
continued to convey a geographic meaning, the composite mark 
could be registered, so long as the geographic term did not 
dominate the mark and it was disclaimed.18 Registrations for 
composite marks containing geographic terms seem to have been 
fairly common. For example, the following marks were registered: 
VIRGINIA BEAUTY for candy;19 VIRGINIA GENTLEMEN in 
stylized form for whisky;20 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE for law 
books;21 FLORIDA CITRUS EXCHANGE as part of a logo for 
citrus fruits;22 FLORIDA GOLD in stylized form for canned 
grapefruit and oranges;23 CP CHICAGO PNEUMATIC as part of a 
logo for machine lubricants;24 MEYER NEW YORK as part of a 
logo for buttons and clothing ornaments.25  
Secondly, federal registration under the 1905 Act did not 
confer many benefits,26 and most firms looked to state common law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916); see U.S. 
Trademark Registration No. 56,100 (August 21, 1906) (THE AMERICAN GIRL in stylized 
form for ladies’ leather shoes); R.W. Eldridge Co. v. Southern Handkerchief Mfg. Co., 23 F. 
Supp. 179, 185 (W.D.S.C. 1938) (holding that ALL AMERICAN for handkerchiefs is not 
geographically descriptive).  
 18. The cases reflect this rule by their focus on whether non-geographic elements were 
significant. See Kraft Cheese Co. v. Coe, 146 F.2d 313, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (OLD ENGLISH 
for cheese unregistrable as geographically descriptive where OLD was descriptive and “the 
only peculiarity of this trademark is the fact that plaintiff uses a familiar Gothic type”); In 
re Lamson & Co., 135 F.2d 1021, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (ELMWOOD FARM unregistrable as 
geographically descriptive because ELMWOOD is the name of several towns and “is clearly 
the dominant part of the mark”).  
 19. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 226,992 (issued April 26, 1927) (disclaimed 
VIRGINIA). 
 20. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 347,081 (issued June 15, 1937). 
 21. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 253,404 (issued February 26, 1929). 
 22. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 169,047 (issued June 5, 1923). 
 23. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 345,625 (issued May 4, 1937). 
 24. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 278,921 (issued January 6, 1931) (disclaimed 
“Chicago” and “Pneumatic.”) 
 25. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 191,259 (issued November 4, 1924) (disclaimed 
“New York”). 
 26. As Professor McCarthy has noted, “[E]ven with the 1920 amendments, the basic 
1905 Trademark Act remained inadequate to cope with the realities of twentieth century 
commerce and brand names.” 1 McCarthy, supra note 6, § 5:3. 
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for effective protection of their marks.27 Under the prevailing 
common-law rules in effect during the first half of the twentieth 
century, a geographic mark could be protected provided the 
merchant could demonstrate secondary meaning.28 
B. 1947 to 1982: The Original Lanham Act Approach 
As originally drafted, the Lanham Act contained a single 
provision explicitly dealing with the registrability of geographic 
terms. Section 2(e) of the Act provided that a mark that was 
“primarily geographically descriptive” or one that was “primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive” could be registered with 
a showing of acquired distinctiveness (or secondary meaning).29 
This brought the Lanham Act into harmony with the prevailing 
common-law doctrine and eliminated the absolute ban on 
registration contained in the 1905 Act.30 Of course it still remained 
significant to determine when a mark was “geographically 
descriptive” or “geographically deceptively misdescriptive” because 
that characterization precluded immediate registration upon first 
use, and triggered the obligation to prove secondary meaning. The 
statute did not, however, define either of those terms, but left that 
task to the courts and to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(TTAB). 
The test that emerged involved essentially two steps. First, 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was 
obliged to determine if the term selected as a mark conveyed to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. “[T]he Federal Trademark Act of 1905 . . . reflected the view that protection of 
trademarks was a matter of state concern and that the right to a mark depended solely on 
the common law.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 105 S. Ct. 658 
(1985). 
 28. “[T]he general rule is thoroughly established, that words that do not in and of 
themselves indicate anything in the nature of origin, manufacture, or ownership, but are 
merely descriptive of the place where an article is manufactured or produced, cannot be 
monopolized as a trademark. . . . But . . .[i]t is undoubtedly true that where such a 
secondary signification has been acquired, its use in that sense will be protected by 
restraining the use of the word by others in such a way as to amount to a fraud on the 
public, and on those to whose employment of it the special meaning has become attached.” 
Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901), overruled on other 
grounds, Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). See, e.g., Vi-Jon Laboratories v. Lentheric, 
Inc., 133 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (company that had used unregistrable mark SHANGHAI 
for toilet articles entitled to oppose registration of “Night in Shanghai” printed in letters 
simulating Chinese characters for perfumes and hand lotions).  
 29. Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 2(e), 60 Stat. 427, 429 (1946). 
 30. As the Chief Examiner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office observed 
shortly after the adoption of the Lanham Act, “[O]ne purpose of the Trademark Act of 1946 
. . . was to change the former statute under which any term could be refused registration 
solely by reason of a geographical meaning, regardless of whether the geographic meaning 
of the word was minor or obscure or remote. . . .” Ex parte London Gramophone Corp., 98 
U.S.P.Q. 362 (Chief Examiner 1953). 
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consumers primarily or immediately a geographic connotation. If 
the term was an obscure or remote locale that most consumers 
would not recognize as a place name, it would be immediately 
registrable without any need for proof of secondary meaning. If, on 
the other hand, the mark did indeed convey a geographic 
significance to the public, the second question was whether the 
goods actually came from the named place. If they did, the mark 
would be considered primarily geographically descriptive; if they 
did not, the mark would be considered “primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive.” 
Occasional controversies did arise concerning the first prong of 
the test. For instance, in In re Charles S. Loeb Pipes, Inc.,31 the 
applicant sought to register the mark OLD DOMINION for pipe 
tobacco. It argued that most consumers would not recognize the 
name as the state nickname of Virginia and that the name 
“possesses nothing more than an archaic, nostalgic or romantic 
allusion to the early days in the south and that, as such, it would 
be completely fanciful to the great majority of Americans.”32 The 
TTAB, however, was not persuaded, observing that “[n]icknames 
and even maps and geographical abbreviations used as 
trademarks, have, over the years, been treated under the common 
law and statutory interpretation in the same manner as ordinary 
geographical marks.”33 
However, where the marks referenced genuinely arcane or 
esoteric geographic place names, as in the cases of the German 
villages of Aying and Jever, which were used respectively by 
different parties as marks for beer, the TTAB declined to find that 
consumers would even recognize them as having geographic 
significance.34 As the Fifth Circuit summarized the law on this 
first prong, “[I]t is not the intent of the federal statute to refuse 
registration of a mark where the geographic meaning is minor, 
obscure, remote, or unconnected with the goods.”35 
The second prong of the test was even less controversial 
because the outcome made no legal difference. Whether or not the 
goods came from the designated place, the applicant would be 
obliged to prove secondary meaning. This black-or-white approach 
was justified by the USPTO on grounds of administrative 
convenience, as it enabled them to avoid “subjective 
determinations by eliminating any need to make unnecessary 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. 190 U.S.P.Q. 238 (T.T.A.B. 1975). 
 32. Id. at 241. 
 33. Id. at 245.  
 34. In re Brauerei Aying Franz Inselkammer KG, 217 U.S.P.Q. 73 (T.T.A.B. 1983); In re 
Bavaria St. Pauli Brauerei AG, 222 U.S.P.Q. 926 (T.T.A.B. 1984). 
 35. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 
1971). 
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inquiry into the nebulous question of whether the public associates 
the particular goods with a particular geographical area.”36 
However, this rule was apparently never applied as woodenly 
as might appear. In any number of pre-1982 cases, the TTAB and 
the courts held that clearly geographic terms could be registered 
without a showing of secondary meaning because they were 
“arbitrary” for the goods in question. Thus, the Ninth Circuit found 
the mark DUTCH BOY for paint to be arbitrary in 1955,37 while 
the TTAB held the mark HAWAIIAN registrable for flavored ice 
products without imposing a requirement on the applicant to show 
secondary meaning.38 
The Lanham Act contains one other provision of potential 
relevance in cases involving geographic marks. No mark can be 
federally registered if it is found to be “deceptive.”39 Marks that 
contravene this rule cannot be salvaged by secondary meaning. 
Deceptiveness, in other words, is an absolute bar to registration, 
whereas under the original Lanham Act a finding of “deceptive 
misdescriptiveness” was not. It was necessary, therefore, to 
distinguish between “deceptively misdescriptive” trademarks 
(registrable on proof of secondary meaning) and “deceptive” 
trademarks (never registrable). 
In the context of geographic marks, the Board’s early efforts to 
articulate the boundary between these two statutory categories 
generated two somewhat inconsistent lines of decisions. One of 
those focused on the intent of the trademark owner. Thus, as the 
TTAB noted in In re Amerise:40  
[A] mark consisting of . . . a geographical term is not deceptive 
under Section 2(a) unless it involves a false assertion 
calculated, either planned, designed, or implied to deceive the 
public as to the geographical origin of the goods bearing the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 97 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting brief of Patent 
Office). 
 37. National Lead Co. v. Wolfe et al., 223 F.2d 195, 200 (9th Cir. 1955) (“The fact that 
‘Dutch’ as a dictionary term has a geographical significance and that it would be possible for 
a manufacturer to use that word in connection with his business in its primary geographical 
sense is beside the point here. . . . No use of the word ‘Dutch’ in a geographical sense is 
involved here for neither appellant nor appellees are marketing products or goods ‘likely to 
be understood by purchasers as representing that the goods or their constituent materials 
were produced or processed in the place designated by the name or that they are of some 
distinctive kind or quality as the goods produced, processed or used in that place.’” (quoting 
Restatement of Torts § 720a)). 
 38. In re Circus Ices, 158 U.S.P.Q. 64 (T.T.A.B. 1968). See also In re International 
Minerals & Chemical Corp., 147 U.S.P.Q. 262 (T.T.A.B. 1965) (holding KENTUCKY TURF 
for fertilizer registrable without requiring proof of secondary meaning). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). This provision appeared in the original version of the statute 
adopted in 1946 and has not been amended in the ensuing 60 years. 
 40. 160 U.S.P.Q. 687 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (mark ITALIAN MAIDE for food products held 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, but not deceptive). 
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mark. This contemplates situations where a party applies a 
geographical designation to a particular product knowing that 
it will bestow upon the product an appearance of greater 
quality or saleability not actually possessed by it with the 
intention thereby of inducing or misleading a particular class 
of consumers into purchasing this product.41 
However, just one year earlier, in In re Sweden Freezer Mfg. 
Co.,42 the TTAB had observed that a geographic mark should be 
held deceptive only when “the impression created by the use of a 
term which has geographical significance is likely to give to the 
article sold thereunder an appearance of greater merit, quality or 
saleability not actually possessed by the product thereby inducing 
or misleading a particular class of consumers into purchasing this 
product.” This focus on “merit” or “saleability” was roughly 
equivalent to the standard the courts had formulated to identify 
deceptive marks in the non-geographic cases. In that context, the 
courts had embraced a standard of “materiality” as the key to the 
distinction between deceptive matter and misdescriptive matter. 
This test focused on whether the inaccurate data communicated by 
the mark under analysis would be important to consumers.43 As 
Professor McCarthy has summarized, the “‘materiality’ test 
focuses upon the question of whether purchasers care whether the 
product contains the misdescribed quality or comes from the 
geographic location named.”44  
By 1983, the Board explicitly repudiated the intent standard, 
and embraced materiality as the key dividing line between 
inaccurate geographic marks that could be salvaged by secondary 
meaning and those that were beyond redemption, declaring, “[I]t 
seems to us that intent of the user of the mark should not be an 
element of a case of geographical deceptiveness. . . . The better 
approach, we believe, is to determine whether the deception is 
material to the purchasing decision. If so, the mark is deceptive 
within the meaning of Section 2(a).”45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Id. at 691. 
 42. 159 U.S.P.Q. 246 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (mark SWEDEN for artificial kidney machines 
held not to be deceptive). 
 43. See e.g., Gold Seal v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), aff’d per curiam, 230 
F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1956) (mark GLASS WAX for cleaning 
product containing no wax held to be deceptively misdescriptive, but not deceptive, on the 
grounds that consumers would not feel aggrieved if they learned about the absence of wax 
in the product). 
 44. 2 McCarthy, supra note 6, § 11:58. See also Kenneth Germain, Trademark 
Registration Under Section 2(a) and 2(e) of the Lanham Act: The Deception Decision, 44 
Fordham L. Rev. 249, 267 (1976). 
 45. In re House of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 53, 56 (T.T.A.B. 1983). 
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Over the years, the TTAB has found relatively few geographic 
marks deceptive. Examples include the mark MAID IN PARIS for 
perfume not originating in the French capital,46 and the mark 
DANISH MAID CULTURED PRODUCTS for dairy products not 
originating in Denmark.47 As we shall see, however, the 
materiality test has assumed a new and different role in the more 
recent case law. 
C. In re Nantucket and “Goods-Place Association” 
In 1978, a firm called Nantucket, Inc. filed an application to 
register the mark NANTUCKET for men’s shirts. Under the 
prevailing test, the examiner first used a dictionary to determine 
that “Nantucket” would be recognized as a geographic term by the 
consuming public. Once that question was answered in the 
affirmative, the mark would necessarily be classified as either 
geographically descriptive or primarily geographically 
misdescriptive, depending on the origin of the goods. Since the 
applicant was based in North Carolina, and since it had conceded 
that the goods did not originate from Nantucket Island, the 
examiner determined that it fell into the latter category. Because 
the applicant had not submitted any proof of secondary meaning, 
the examiner denied the application, and that determination was 
sustained by the TTAB.48 
The applicant appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, which reversed. It held that the “flaw in the board’s test” 
was “its factoring out the nature of applicant’s goods,” and its 
“failure to give appropriate weight to the presence of [the word] 
‘deceptively’ in 2(e)(2).”49 Chief Judge Markey, writing for the 
court, explained: 
[G]eographically deceptive misdescriptiveness cannot be 
determined without considering whether the public associates 
the goods with the place which the mark names. If the goods 
do not come from the place named and the public makes no 
goods-place association, the public is not deceived and the 
mark is accordingly not geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive.50 
Applying this newly announced test to the facts before the 
court in a single paragraph at the end of the opinion, Judge 
Markey declared that “there is no indication that the purchasing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. In re Richemond, 131 U.S.P.Q. 441 (T.T.A.B. 1961). 
 47. In re Danish Maid Cultured Products, Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. 430 (T.T.A.B. 1967). 
 48. In re Nantucket, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 868 (T.T.A.B. 1981). 
 49. In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 50. Id. at 99.  
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public would expect men’s shirts to have their origin in Nantucket 
when seen in the market place with NANTUCKET on them.”51 
Although the brevity of his discussion makes it hard to be certain, 
he appeared to rest that conclusion on the absence of evidence in 
the record to the contrary, rather than on a determination on the 
merits. Of course, the lack of such evidence would most likely be 
explained by the fact that neither the examiner nor the TTAB 
thought that type of evidence was necessary under the legal test 
that governed at the time the mark was examined. Yet even 
though the requirement of a goods-place association was a newly 
announced legal test, the court did not think it necessary to return 
the case to the examiner to see if any evidence on that issue could 
be adduced. 
Judge Nies, in her concurring opinion, did offer a suggestion of 
how a goods-place association might be determined in future cases. 
She observed: 
The PTO frequently makes use of telephone directories in 
connection with proving surname significance. The same type 
of evidence could be made of record to show that businesses 
dealing in the same or related goods exist in the named area. 
This would, in my view, make a prima facie case.52 
She then went on to speculate that “[w]ith a name such as 
NANTUCKET, one would expect that there are at least some 
goods for which the term is arbitrary.”53 
Judge Nies did not indicate why she thought there were no 
vendors or manufacturers of shirts on Nantucket.54 
Beyond the suggestion in the concurrence to consult telephone 
directories, there is nothing else in the Nantucket decision 
illuminating when or how a goods-place association should be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Id. at 101. 
 52. Id. at 106 (Nies, J., concurring). 
 53. Id.  
 54. While it is unclear what the situation would have been in 1982, it is hard to 
imagine that a major resort and vacation destination like Nantucket did not have a number 
of stores selling leisure wear and T-shirts, some of which might have been either made or 
decorated on the island. For example, a company called Murray’s Toggery Shop claims to 
have been selling a line of clothing, starting with pants but now including shirts, under the 
name “Nantucket Reds” since the mid-1940s. See http://www.nantucketreds.com/ 
reds_history.html. In 2005, the website of the Nantucket Chamber of Commerce listed three 
T-shirt vendors, including one called Nantucket Peddlers. See http://www. 
nantucketchamber.org/directory/merchants/ (visited March 20, 2006). The online phone 
directory “switchboard.com” yields five businesses in response to a search for the keyword 
“shirts” in Nantucket, Massachusetts. At least one business on Nantucket, called The 
Sunken Ship, sells a variety of shirts emblazoned with the word “Nantucket” on the chest 
(and one with the legend “I am the man from Nantucket”). See http://www.sunkenship.com/ 
MX_Kart/t_shirts.php (visited March 20, 2006). It is hard to imagine that the law clerks of 
Judges Markey and Nies would have been unable to find similar information even without 
the convenience of the Internet to assist them.  
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found. Indeed, as the TTAB pointed out very shortly after 
Nantucket was decided, “Nantucket gave no specific guidance as to 
how a goods-place association may be established with respect to 
marks held primarily geographically descriptive.”55 
For the following decade, the TTAB and the newly created 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did the best they could to 
ascertain whether a goods-place association existed as they 
confronted the enormous number of applications involving 
geographic place names. Along the way, they announced a few 
subsidiary rules that purported to guide the process of determining 
whether the all-important association existed. Much of that 
meager body of law is summarized in the Trademark Manual of 
Examining Procedure,56 and will be discussed in the following 
section, after we conclude our chronological recap. 
D. NAFTA and TRIPS 
The foregoing doctrinal evolution took place largely without 
regard to the law in other countries. Although the world 
community had concluded two treaties dealing specifically with the 
topic of geographic indicators,57 the United States had opted not to 
sign either,58 and was subject only to two rather weak provisions of 
the Paris Convention.59 This history of splendid isolation ended in 
1993 with the U.S. adoption of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, or NAFTA. 
Chapter 17 of NAFTA contains a number of rules dealing with 
intellectual property, one of which specifically addresses the issue 
of geographical indications. The most relevant language for the 
present discussion, contained in Article 1712, provides:  
(1) Each Party shall provide, in respect of geographical 
indications, the legal means for interested persons to prevent: 
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of 
a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. In re Handler Fenton Westerns, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. 848, 850 (T.T.A.B. 1982). In the 
following year the TTAB observed that the requisite goods-place association exists if the 
public would conclude that the mark “imparts information about the geographic origin of 
the goods.” In re House of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 53, 55 (T.T.A.B. 1983). 
 56. See Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1210.04 (5th ed. 2005). 
 57. They are, respectively, the Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or 
Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods, April 14, 1891, revised October 31, 1958, 828 
U.N.T.S. 389, available online at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/madrid/trtdocs_wo032. 
html, and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin, October 31, 
1958, amended September 28, 1979, available online at http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/ 
legal_texts/lisbon_agreement.htm.  
 58. As of this writing, the United States has still not signed these treaties, and in the 
authors’ opinion is unlikely to do so anytime soon. 
 59. For a discussion of those provisions, see infra note 191.  
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originates in a territory, region or locality other than the true 
place of origin, in a manner that misleads the public as to the 
geographical origin of the good; . . .  
(2) Each Party shall, on its own initiative if its domestic law so 
permits or at the request of an interested person, refuse to 
register, or invalidate the registration of, a trademark 
containing or consisting of a geographical indication with 
respect to goods that do not originate in the indicated 
territory, region or locality, if use of the indication in the 
trademark for such goods is of such a nature as to mislead the 
public as to the geographical origin of the good.60 
Shortly after this provision came into force Congress adopted 
the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act61 
which, in part, attempted to conform the Lanham Act to the new 
treaty obligation set out above. Congress accomplished that result 
by uncoupling the category of PGDM marks from that of “primarily 
geographically descriptive” ones and providing that the former 
could no longer be salvaged by proof of secondary meaning.62 As a 
result of this legislation, a finding that a mark was PGDM would 
become an absolute bar to registration. 
Just two years after these developments, work was finalized 
on the new World Trade Organization treaty and its accompanying 
intellectual property agreement, known as the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS. 
Like NAFTA, TRIPS addresses geographical indications. It does so 
in two respects. First, Article 22 of TRIPS contains language 
substantially identical to the provisions of NAFTA Article 1712 
quoted above, requiring WTO members both to refuse to register 
geographical indications, and to allow interested parties to bring 
legal actions to prevent their use, if they would mislead the public 
as to the true place of origin of goods.63 Second, Article 23 of TRIPS 
provides even greater protection for geographical indications used 
in connection with wines and spirits because it prohibits the 
registration of an indication that identifies a place that is not the 
source of a given wine or spirit, regardless of whether that 
indication is misleading.64  
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Art. 1712, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993). 
 61. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). 
 62. Id. § 333(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2(e)(3), 2(f)). 
 63. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened 
for signature April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Rounds vol. 31 
[hereinafter TRIPS], Arts. 22(2), 22(3), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1995).  
 64. Id. Art. 23(2). Article 23 also requires WTO members to enable interested parties to 
bring legal actions to prevent the use of such indications even if the true origin of the wines 
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Because the provisions in TRIPS Article 22 addressing 
geographical indications in general were substantially identical to 
those in NAFTA, and Congress had already amended the Lanham 
Act to conform to NAFTA, the WTO treaty did not result in any 
general change in U.S. legal treatment of geographic marks. 
Rather, the only further change in U.S. law concerning geographic 
marks was a provision implementing the heightened protection for 
wines and spirits under Article 23. That provision added an 
additional item to the list of marks permanently barred from 
registration under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, namely, “a 
geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with 
wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the 
goods.”65  
In sum, the major legacy of NAFTA and TRIPS for the 
treatment of geographic marks under U.S. law was the absolute 
ban on registration of PGDM marks, which under the NAFTA 
Implementation Act could no longer be saved by secondary 
meaning. For a decade after the passage of that Act, the USPTO, 
the TTAB, and the Federal Circuit all continued to use the criteria 
that had been applicable before the Act for determining whether or 
not a mark was PGDM. Those criteria included a requirement that 
the mark have as its primary significance a generally known 
geographic place; a “goods/place association”; and a finding that 
the goods did not, in fact, come from the place indicated by the 
mark. A materiality requirement, however, was nowhere in sight.66 
                                                                                                                                         
 
or spirits is indicated and even if the indications are accompanied by words like “style” or 
“imitation.” Id. Art. 23(1). For example, under this provision a vintner from the Burgundy 
area of France should be able to prevent a California vintner from using the designation 
“Napa Valley Imitation Burgundy.” In Article 24(1) of TRIPS, WTO members agreed to 
enter negotiations aimed at protecting other geographical indications under the higher 
standards of Article 23, see id. Art. 24(1), and the European Community, in particular, has 
made efforts to promote such extended protection. See, e.g., Burkhart Goebel, Geographical 
Indications and Trademarks—The Road from Doha, 93 TMR 964, 986-87 (2003) (discussing 
the call for such extension). Given the opposition to such extension from such “new world” 
countries as the United States, Australia, Canada, and Chile, however, it seems unlikely 
that it will occur anytime soon, if ever.  
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), added by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, 108 Stat. 4809, § 522 (1994). This ban is applicable only to those indications first used 
by the applicant one year after the WTO Agreement enters into force with respect to the 
United States. See id. More recently, the United States and the European Community 
entered into an Agreement on Trade in Wine, which, among other things, obligates the 
United States to seek legislation prohibiting any new use of certain terms of geographic 
derivation, such as “burgundy,” “chablis,” “champagne,” “port,” “rhine,” and “sherry,” on 
wines originating outside of the European Community. See Agreement Between the United 
States of America and the European Community on Trade in Wine, http://www.ustr. 
gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2005/asset_upload_file917_8030.pdf (initialled 
Sept. 14, 2005).  
 66. Of course, materiality had become a requirement for a mark to be deemed deceptive 
under Section 2(a), see supra, text accompanying notes 40-45, but not for a mark to be 
deemed PGDM under Section 2(e). See, e.g., In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 
798 Vol. 96 TMR 
 
The addition of such a requirement marks the beginning of a new, 
final chapter in the history of U.S. legal treatment of geographic 
marks to date.  
E. California Innovations, Les Halles, and Beyond  
The year 2003 brought two significant decisions from the 
Federal Circuit on geographic marks. The first, In re California 
Innovations Inc.,67 added a materiality requirement to the criteria 
necessary to find a trademark PGDM. The second, In re Les Halles 
de Paris J.V.,68 articulated higher burdens for finding a service 
mark to be PGDM, as opposed to a trademark for goods, both with 
respect to the requirement of a “goods-place” or “services-place” 
association, and with respect to the newly recognized materiality 
requirement. 
In In re California Innovations, the USPTO refused to register 
the mark CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS for insulated bags and 
related items on the ground that it was PGDM, and the TTAB 
upheld that refusal.69 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that 
the USPTO and TTAB erred in finding the trademark PGDM 
without a demonstration that the geographic misrepresentation 
was material to a consumer’s decision to purchase the goods. 
The court gave two reasons for imposing a materiality 
requirement in this context. First, it noted that the NAFTA 
amendments rendered the consequences of being deemed PGDM 
the same as those for being deemed deceptive: permanent denial of 
registration. Because the legal consequences of falling into those 
two categories were now the same, the court concluded that the 
standards for inclusion in those categories should also be the 
same.70 Second, it reasoned that a failure to include a materiality 
requirement in the PGDM criteria would “almost read the term 
                                                                                                                                         
 
1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding the TTAB’s affirmance of the USPTO’s refusal to 
register THE VENICE COLLECTION and SAVE VENICE, INC. for a variety of goods, and 
citing pre-1993 precedent for the requirements for a mark to be deemed PGDM); In re 
Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (upholding the TTAB’s affirmance of the 
USPTO’s refusal to register NEW YORK WAYS GALLERY for luggage, bags, and wallets, 
and citing pre-1993 precedent for PGDM requirements).  
 67. 329 F.3d 1334 (2003). 
 68. 334 F.3d 1371 (2003). 
 69. See In re California Innovations Inc., 2002 WL 243562 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2002). 
 70. See Wada, 194 F.3d at 1339 (“The classifications under the new § 1052 clarify that 
the two deceptive categories both receive permanent rejection. Accordingly, the test for 
rejecting a deceptively misdescriptive mark is no longer simple lack of distinctiveness, but 
the higher showing of deceptiveness.”); id. at 1340 (“[B]y placing geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks under subsection (e)(3) in the same final circumstances as deceptive 
marks under subsection (a), the NAFTA Act also elevated the standards for identifying 
those deceptive marks.”).  
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‘deceptively’ out of § 1052(e)(3).”71 To give that term a plausible 
meaning, the court reasoned that materiality had to be part of the 
PGDM test. 
Although two other Federal Circuit cases on PGDM marks 
decided after the NAFTA amendments did “not expressly address 
the materiality issue,”72 the California Innovations court concluded 
that these cases nevertheless reached results consistent with a 
materiality requirement. In both cases, the trademarks referred to 
places that were “known,” “well-known,” or “renowned” for the 
products at issue.73 The California Innovations court concluded 
that a finding that the place indicated by the mark is noted for the 
goods on which the mark is proposed to be used is sufficient to 
raise a presumption of materiality.74 
The California Innovations decision has resulted in a number 
of dramatic changes in the legal analysis and treatment of 
geographic trademarks. Most notably, the decision creates a 
category of geographically misdescriptive marks that are 
immediately registrable, while both geographically descriptive 
marks, and marks that are descriptive or deceptively 
misdescriptive in ways unconnected with geography, still require 
secondary meaning to be registered upon the Principal Register.75 
In many cases, the decision also shifts the focus of inquiry from the 
goods-place association, which was crucial and therefore under 
constant examination and development in the first two decades 
after In re Nantucket, to the requirement of “materiality.” In 
particular, in the context of the initial examination of registration 
applications, the decision pointedly raises the question of what 
kind of evidence examining attorneys can locate and present in 
support of a finding that a geographic misrepresentation is in fact 
material to a purchase decision. 
The final piece in the historical puzzle is the case of In re Les 
Halles de Paris J.V.,76 decided shortly after California Innovations. 
The Les Halles case involved the mark LE MARAIS for a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Id. at 1340. 
 72. Id. at 1341. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (authorizing a refusal to register a mark that “when used 
on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively 
misdescriptive of them”); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (authorizing a refusal to register a mark 
that “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily 
geographically descriptive of them”); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (providing that “[e]xcept as 
expressly excluded in [certain subsections that do not include (e)(1) or (e)(2)], nothing in this 
chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become 
distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.”).  
 76. 334 F.3d 1371 (2003). 
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restaurant in New York that served kosher French cuisine. The 
TTAB had upheld the PTO’s refusal to register the mark on the 
ground that the mark was PGDM, because Le Marais was a 
traditionally Jewish neighborhood in Paris, while the restaurant 
was located in New York and had no commercial connection to the 
Parisian neighborhood.77 The Federal Circuit used the case as an 
opportunity to elaborate on the application of its new California 
Innovations PGDM test to services. In two respects, it imposed 
more demanding evidentiary burdens to support a finding that a 
service mark, as opposed to a mark for goods, was PGDM. 
First, the court asserted, a services-place association, unlike a 
goods-place association, cannot be presumed from the fact that the 
place indicated by the mark is known for the services in question.78 
A consumer who purchases, say, fabric in New York does not know 
where the fabric was made, and thus could easily be led to believe 
that the fabric was made in Paris by the use of a mark that 
incorporated the name of that city or one of its neighborhoods. By 
contrast, reasoned the court, a customer entering a restaurant in 
New York knows that the restaurant services are being rendered 
in New York, not Paris.79 Thus, there must be some further 
demonstration that restaurant patrons would be led to believe that 
the restaurant services nonetheless in some way originated in the 
place named by the mark—perhaps that the food was imported 
from that place, or the chef trained there. 
Second, the court held, an inference that the services-place 
association is material to a customer’s decision to purchase cannot 
be drawn merely from evidence that the place is famous for the 
services at issue, as it can with goods. Rather, the USPTO must 
either demonstrate a very strong services-place association or 
present other direct evidence of materiality.80 The example of such 
evidence that the court mentions—an advertisement by a 
restaurant that its chef’s training in the place indicated by the 
mark is “a reason to choose this restaurant”81—suggests that 
materiality will be particularly hard to prove when the service 
mark is not yet in use at the time of examination and no 
promotional or informational literature is yet available.82 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., 2002 TTAB LEXIS 263 (May 2, 2002). 
 78. 334 F.3d at 1374. 
 79. Id. at 1373. 
 80. Id. at 1374. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See David J. Kera & Theodore H. Davis Jr., The Fifty-Seventh Year of 
Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 95 TMR 5, 12 (2005) (making this 
point). 
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The California Innovations and Les Halles cases, then, 
exemplify all three of the broad trends that we can discern when 
looking back over the sweep of a century of U.S. legal treatment of 
geographic marks: increasing liberalization in the registration of 
such marks; an increasing emphasis on consumer perception, as 
manifested by the “goods-place association” and “materiality” tests; 
and a declining role for secondary meaning, as the choice whether 
or not to protect geographic trademarks has increasingly become 
an “all-or-nothing” matter.  
III. GEOGRAPHIC TERMS UNDER 
THE ORIGINAL LANHAM ACT:  
IN SEARCH OF A PRO-COMPETITIVE APPROACH 
Now that we have completed our whirlwind tour through the 
history of geographic terms in trademark law, our task becomes 
prescriptive: sorting out the good developments from the bad. By 
“good developments,” we mean generally those rules that tend to 
further competition in ways that benefit consumers. By “bad 
developments,” we mean rules that tend to allow firms to use 
trademark rules to achieve unjustified market power, which allows 
them to raise prices to the detriment of consumers. In this section, 
we focus on judicial interpretation of the Lanham Act as it existed 
between 1946 and 1993. We develop an account of the traditional 
interest in protecting merchants’ ability to tell consumers about 
the qualities of the goods and services they offer, which is to say, 
their ability to engage in commercial communication. We then 
develop accounts of the interests that weigh in favor of and against 
granting trademark protection to geographical designations, and of 
the roles of the descriptive fair use defense and secondary meaning 
in balancing these interests. In light of those accounts, we then 
evaluate the goods-place association test and the subjective 
approach that it exemplifies. We argue that a subjective approach 
cannot adequately protect commercial communication, and we 
advocate the addition of an objective component to strengthen that 
protection. 
It turns out that the bulk of our analysis of geographic marks 
is in this section, which may seem odd, since the statutory 
framework we discuss in this section has not existed for over a 
decade. There is a reason for this. The statutory framework for 
geographic marks during this era was relatively clear. As we 
explain below, the 1993 NAFTA Implementation Act went further 
than necessary to conform U.S. law to NAFTA, and in the process 
moved the law away from an optimum balance of the interests. 
The 2003 decision of the Federal Circuit in In re California 
Innovations then interpreted those NAFTA amendments in a 
surprising and counterintuitive way, adding another layer of 
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confusion. We think it is best to postpone consideration of the 
muddled result until Part IV, after we have worked through a 
more simple model.  
A. A Framework for Evaluating Consumer Interests 
The rules we are interested in evaluating are those that 
determine whether a trademark that uses a geographical 
designation will be protected and registrable (1) immediately; (2) 
after a showing of secondary meaning; or (3) never. This 
evaluation must take account of the potential costs of extending 
trademark protection to geographical designations; of the potential 
benefits; of the scope of trademark protection granted; and of the 
purposes served by delaying protection until secondary meaning is 
proven. We consider each of these in turn.  
1. Costs of Protecting Toponyms as Trademarks 
Affording trademark protection to a word or phrase makes 
that word or phrase largely unavailable to competing merchants.83 
To the extent that the word or phrase uniquely communicates 
important information to consumers, competitors who are 
precluded from using it cannot inform consumers that they are 
offering goods or services that in at least one respect are 
equivalent to those of the mark owner. That, in turn, gives the 
mark owner a degree of market power, permitting it to raise prices 
above those that would have prevailed in a more competitive 
environment, leaving consumers worse off.  
Historically, therefore, the central concern of trademark policy 
in granting protection to marks incorporating geographic terms 
has been the desire to avoid burdening the ability of competitors to 
communicate effectively with their customers. To provide 
information about the geographic origin of goods and services is 
simply to describe one of their features, and thus this concern is of 
a piece with protecting descriptive uses and commercial 
communication more generally. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in 1920, if competitors can make like goods, then they “with equal 
truth, may use, and must be free to use, the same language of 
description in placing their goods before the public.”84 This insight 
underlies the very idea of distinctiveness, and of a “distinctiveness 
spectrum” from generic to fanciful.85 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. The qualification “largely” reflects the fact that under the descriptive fair use 
defense, competitors retain legal rights to use descriptive terms. We will consider the 
implications of that defense below.  
 84. Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 544 (1920).  
 85. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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Granting trademark rights to a geographic term makes it 
more difficult for a competitor who is located in the place 
designated by the term to inform the public of its location. This is 
true whether or not the trademark holder is also located in that 
place. For example, granting trademark rights to SANTA CRUZ 
for surfboards to a company located in Santa Cruz, California,86 
will make it more difficult for another Santa Cruz, California-
based surfboard maker to inform the public of its location; 
granting trademark rights to SANTA CRUZ for video and 
computer game sound cards to a company located in Yonkers, New 
York,87 will likewise make it more difficult for a sound card maker 
actually located in Santa Cruz, California, to tell the public of that 
fact.  
Geographic origin may be important to consumers for a variety 
of reasons. Consumers may know, for example, that a particular 
region has climatic and soil conditions that contribute desirable 
qualities to an agricultural product; such ties between agricultural 
products and the locations in which they are grown make them the 
focus of much of the international debate currently raging over 
protection for geographical indications.88 Consumers may also 
know that a region has a tradition of fine craftsmanship in a 
particular field of manufacturing. They may want to use their 
purchasing power to help the economy of a particular region, or to 
avoid helping it. They may believe that local manufacturers will 
likely be more accountable if a product is defective. It is easier to 
return a defective product to a local manufacturer for repair or 
refund, and as a member of the local political and social 
community the manufacturer is susceptible to a wider variety of 
channels of persuasion. 
In addition, geographic terms may sometimes provide the sole 
means of conveying important non-geographic information. 
“Hunan” is the only convenient way of describing the distinctive 
traditional cuisine of the Hunan province of China, even though 
that cuisine can be prepared outside the province, and is not the 
only cuisine practiced there. In cases of this sort, granting 
trademark protection to geographic terms may sometimes also 
make it more difficult for competitors to convey non-geographic 
information to consumers. 
Thus, one cost of overly lenient rules regarding geographic 
marks is to hinder competitors in providing information valued by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. See U.S. Trademark Registration Application Ser. No. 78163117 (filed September 
11, 2002). 
 87. See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2666399 (issued December 24, 2002). 
 88. Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About 
Geographical Indications, 58 Hastings L.J. ____ (forthcoming, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=331959. 
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consumers. That, in turn, will lessen consumers’ ability to 
determine whether two brands of a given product are, in fact, 
identical regarding a key trait. The result is increased search costs 
for consumers, and inappropriate market power in the hands of 
the party controlling the use of the geographic term. 
If a good or service does not originate in a place designated by 
a given geographic term, another undesirable effect of granting 
exclusive rights to use the term may be aiding a merchant in 
providing inaccurate information to consumers. Of course, a 
merchant does not need exclusive rights in a term to use it to 
deceive consumers, so the problem of deception is not completely 
addressed by denying exclusive rights. Thus, the Lanham Act also 
makes any person who misrepresents the geographic origin of his 
or her goods or services civilly liable to others who are damaged by 
such a misrepresentation.89 However, the potential for injury is 
exacerbated by enabling a merchant to build a brand based on 
deception, and by lending the deceptive use of a term the 
appearance of official sanction, through, for example, the display of 
a ® symbol. 
2. The Benefits of Protecting Geographic Marks 
At one extreme, one could extend the hard line of the 1905 Act 
on registration and deny all trademark protection for geographic 
terms, whatsoever. This, however, would force merchants to forgo 
some important and possibly innocuous benefits of some uses of 
geographic terms as source indicators. 
For example, many geographic terms are memorable and 
enable consumers to more easily recall the merchant’s goods or 
services and their qualities. AMAZON for online retailing 
services90 is certainly easier to remember than 69.227.133.7291 for 
online retailing services. In particular, many geographic terms are 
well known around the world, and they have become standardized 
among people who speak many different languages, thus enabling 
merchants to build internationally memorable brands. In addition, 
many geographic terms can provide suggestive information about 
the qualities or traits of goods and services while preserving 
competitors’ access to directly descriptive terms and to other 
equally suggestive terms. BAJA FRESH for restaurant services92 
suggests Mexican cuisine, but leaves competitors free to use 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). Various state laws also provide private remedies 
against firms that engage in misleading practices of this sort. 
 90. See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2832943 (issued April 13, 2004). 
 91. One of the Internet Protocol Addresses assigned to Amazon.com, Inc. See 
http://ws.arin.net/cgi-bin/whois.pl?queryinput=69.227.133.72 (visited January 17, 2006). 
 92. See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2301436 (issued December 21, 1999). 
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“Mexican” in the names of their restaurants, and also to use many 
other names of places in Mexico (as well as many other words that 
are evocative of Mexico) to signal that the restaurants serve 
Mexican cuisine.93 Many geographic terms also have a mystique or 
caché—an evocative power—that lends a desirable aura to 
merchants’ offerings. PARK AVENUE for automobiles94 does not 
just provide somewhat weak information about the car model so 
named, but may itself contribute to the experience and allure of 
the car.95 While the social value of such an effect may be more 
controversial, there is certainly a long tradition of allowing 
merchants to exploit that effect if the use of the term in question 
does not raise other concerns.  
3. The Scope of Protection and 
the Doctrine of Descriptive Fair Use 
 The benefits and costs of trademark protection depend, of 
course, on the scope of the rights granted. Thus, federal 
registration can have more serious consequences than common-law 
trademark protection usually does because the rights that follow 
from registration are broader, and make it possible, for example, to 
obtain rights to a trademark beyond the geographic region of 
actual use of that mark. In turn, common-law protection provides 
more serious consequences than the minimal unfair competition 
protection afforded even to marks that have become generic.96 
If the most important policy goal in regulating protection of 
geographic marks is that of preserving access to terms competitors 
need to describe their goods, then the most important feature of 
the protection granted is the exception for descriptive fair use. This 
exception is sometimes framed as a defense, and sometimes as a 
matter of the scope of injunctive relief. 
 The doctrine of descriptive fair use rests on the policy 
judgment that even if one merchant has gained trademark 
protection for a term, other merchants should still be able to use 
that term not as a trademark but to describe a good or service that 
has the nature or qualities to which the term refers. Descriptive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. This analysis would be different if the key aspect of the cuisine in question were 
unique to the region of Baja California. If that were the case, there would be few, if any, 
viable synonyms for competitors. 
 94. See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1526752 (issued February 28, 1989). 
 95. See, e.g., Shahar Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for 
Protecting Irrational Beliefs, U. Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 285 
(2006), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=890632. 
 96. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) (holding that 
even though the term “shredded wheat” had become generic, a competitor must exercise its 
right to use the term “in a manner which reasonably distinguishes its product from that of 
the plaintiff [which initially used the term]”). 
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fair use has long been recognized at common law as a limit on 
injunctive relief against the use of geographic terms,97 and is 
explicitly acknowledged in federal law at Sections 33(a)98 and 
33(b)(4)99 of the Lanham Act.100 
Obviously, the descriptive fair use doctrine is an important 
additional safeguard for a competitor’s ability to communicate 
freely and thus is a safeguard of consumer interests. The fact that 
it is available even when a mark has been granted immediate 
protection may therefore seem to reduce the risks of dispensing 
with a secondary meaning requirement and allowing firms to 
appropriate geographical designations immediately upon first use. 
However, the effectiveness of this defense depends on its scope. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent consideration of that scope in the 
case of KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc.101 confirms that the defense is unlikely to be strong enough to 
vindicate competitor communicative interests on its own. The 
holding of the case sounds a positive note by rejecting an 
interpretation of Section 33(b)(4) that would have rendered the 
descriptive fair use meaningless by making it available only when 
the defendant could show that its use created no likelihood of 
confusion about the origin of the goods or services in question. 
Moreover, the Court reaffirmed the importance of allowing 
competitors access to descriptive terms:  
The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on 
the part of consumers followed from the very fact that in cases 
like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be 
used as a mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing 
anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive 
term simply by grabbing it first. . . . The Lanham Act adopts a 
similar leniency, there being no indication that the statute 
was meant to deprive commercial speakers of the ordinary 
utility of descriptive words. “If any confusion results, that is a 
risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. See, e.g., American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 
53 N.E. 141 (1899); Midwest Research Inst. v. S & B Promotions, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1007 
(W.D. Mo. 1988). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
 100. Section 33(b)(4) indicates that the defense is available even when registration of the 
mark has become “incontestable.” Section 33(a) provides that registered marks are still 
subject to “any legal or equitable defense or defect, including those set forth in subsection 
(b), which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1115(a) (emphasis added).  
 101. 543 U.S. 111, 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004). 
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product with a mark that uses a well known descriptive 
phrase.”102 
The Court’s comments on the interpretations of Section 
33(b)(4) advocated by the parties and amici, however, suggest that 
neither the federal defense nor its common-law analogue is a 
guarantee of easy competitor access to descriptive terms. The 
Court explicitly declined to rule that the defense was available 
whenever the descriptive term described the goods accurately, 
without any regard to the likelihood of confusion it caused.103 It 
also declined to rule that the degree of likelihood of confusion must 
be taken into account as a factor, even though both lower court 
interpretations of the Lanham Act104 and common-law precedent105 
are strongly in favor of that approach. Indeed, some inquiry into 
the likelihood of confusion generated by a defendant’s particular 
use of the plaintiff’s mark would seem necessary to provide any 
protection for secondary meaning. Yet that inquiry means that 
competitors who do not merely state their geographic location in 
small print in an obscure corner of their packaging, but announce 
that location prominently enough to be noticed by consumers, run 
the risk of exceeding the defense and thereby becoming infringers. 
In other words, incorporating a likelihood of confusion inquiry into 
a descriptive fair use analysis substantially reduces the degree to 
which a merchant can be confident of being protected thereby 
without litigating the issue. In case of litigation, it also drastically 
reduces the likelihood that the defense could be successfully raised 
in a dispositive pre-trial motion. The uncertainty whether the 
descriptive fair use defense will protect a merchant in a particular 
case, and the inability to get a ruling early in litigation on whether 
it does apply, both mean that the defense is hardly a substitute for 
the safeguards provided by the requirement of secondary meaning 
for descriptive terms.  
Moreover, some merchants who are unsophisticated regarding 
trademark law and who do not have the advice of counsel might be 
easily intimidated into abandoning place name usages that are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Id. at 122 (quoting Cosmetically Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA 
Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997)).  
 103. See id. at 123-24. 
 104. See id. at 551 (noting that the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held that 
likelihood of confusion should be a factor in deciding whether the descriptive fair use 
defense applies, and citing Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 110 F.3d 234 
(4th Cir. 1997), and Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 
1995)). 
 105. See American Waltham Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141 (1899) (holding that a 
merchant who was the first user of a descriptive mark that has gained secondary meaning 
“may put later comers to the trouble of taking such reasonable precautions as are 
commercially practicable to prevent their lawful names and advertisements from deceitfully 
diverting the plaintiff’s custom”).  
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plainly covered by the fair use doctrine. That could occur if the 
first firm to appropriate the place name received immediate 
federal registration and then threatened competitors who 
subsequently use the place name with infringement suits, 
regardless of the nature or manner of their use. Being unaware of 
the fair use defense and fearing costly litigation, these competitors 
might abandon the use of the designation even if that made it 
difficult for them to communicate their product equivalence to 
customers.  
4. The Functions of a 
Secondary Meaning Requirement  
At common law, if a brand name was deemed descriptive, the 
merchant using that name could get trademark protection only 
after demonstrating that a substantial percentage of potential 
purchasers of the product in question had begun to perceive the 
name as an indication of a particular source for the product, rather 
than being merely a descriptive term for some feature of the 
product.106 The consumer perception of a descriptive term as a 
source indicator became known as its “secondary meaning.”107  
This delay in protection serves at least two important 
functions. First, it provides a market test of competitor need for a 
term in cases in which courts are uncertain of that need—an 
uncertainty that is perhaps the principal reason for creating an 
intermediate category of trademarks that are neither generic 
(definitely needed by competitors), nor arbitrary (definitely not 
needed by competitors). Because descriptive terms are not 
protectable immediately upon adoption as a brand name, a 
merchant who begins to use a descriptive term as a brand name is 
vulnerable to the risk that other merchants will also start to use it 
as a brand name before the first merchant can build a secondary 
meaning. If other merchants do use the term, and that use 
prevents secondary meaning from developing in the first 
merchant, that is a good sign that other merchants actually need 
the term, and that therefore no one merchant should get exclusive 
rights to it.108 Conversely, non-use by rivals over an extended 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 13(b), 14 (1995). 
 107. See id.  
 108. See, e.g., Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(“The copying of a descriptive mark that has not acquired secondary meaning does not imply 
passing off, for by definition it describes properties which the brand has in common with 
other brands. . . . [C]opying is consistent with an inference that the copier wanted merely to 
inform consumers about the properties of his own product or service.”). A minority tradition 
of granting relief against certain practices deemed unfair even in the absence of secondary 
meaning developed in New York and became identified as “secondary meaning in the 
making”; for a description and strong criticism of this theory, see 2 McCarthy, supra note 6, 
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period of time demonstrates that no other merchant finds the term 
essential to effective commercial communication. That makes us 
comfortable in eventually giving the first user exclusive rights to 
the term (albeit subject to a descriptive fair use defense), which we 
do by recognizing that secondary meaning has developed. 
Second, the need to prove secondary meaning provides an 
incentive for the merchant to display the descriptive term properly 
as a brand name by juxtaposing it with the word “brand” and a 
generic term identifying the goods or services in a phrase such as 
“PHILADEPHIA brand cream cheese,” and to use a stylized font 
and other clues to establish that the term is being used as a brand 
name. This discourages the merchant from displaying the term in 
a way that consumers might perceive as a descriptive use, while at 
the same time deterring competitors from using the term.109 
The federal registration scheme makes proof of secondary 
meaning a requirement for registering an otherwise descriptive 
mark, and that requirement serves the same purposes as the 
common-law doctrine. The federal scheme modifies the common-
law doctrine in two respects. First, it adds a presumption that a 
mark has gained secondary meaning when the applicant can prove 
five years of “substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as 
a mark . . . in commerce.”110 As long as the requirement of showing 
“substantially exclusive” use is taken seriously, the fact that no 
one else has used the designation in question for five years 
provides good alternative evidence of lack of competitor need for 
that term, while reducing the cost of providing actual proof of 
secondary meaning. 
Second, the federal scheme prevents any challenge to a 
registered mark on grounds of descriptiveness once registration of 
the mark has become “incontestable,” that is, once the registrant 
has demonstrated that it has used the mark continuously for five 
years after registration without a successful or pending challenge, 
and has filed an affidavit making such an assertion.111 The five-
year period begins to run only upon Principal Register 
registration, that is, only after the mark owner has proven 
secondary meaning to the satisfaction of the USPTO. Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 
§§ 15:12-15:20; for judicial rejection of this theory, see Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 
F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992); A.J. Canfield v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 109. One might think that this behavior would be self-limiting, since generally 
merchants want to build a brand, and using a descriptive term in a fashion that consumers 
would perceive as merely descriptive would disable that term from serving as a brand 
signal. However, because packaging usually displays multiple brand signals, a merchant 
could use a producer brand name, an additional product brand name, and various graphic 
elements to build a brand, while gaining exclusive rights to a descriptive term.  
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 1065; see Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 
(1985). 
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provision serves much the same function as a statute of limitations 
on challenges to the USPTO determination, and the registration 
serves as additional notice to competitors (other than the public 
use itself) that someone is claiming exclusive rights to the use of 
the term in question.  
B. The Subjective Approach to Descriptiveness 
 If we want to grant immediate trademark protection to some 
uses of geographic terms, but also want to require a showing of 
secondary meaning for other uses, how do we draw the line? There 
are two basic approaches to sorting out such uses that are common 
to geographic and non-geographic terms. The first is a subjective 
approach, which inquires whether consumers would believe that 
the use of a term is intended to impart information about some 
quality of a good. In the case of geographic terms, this would be 
information about the geographic origin of the good. For instance, 
would consumers believe that the Buick PARK AVENUE 
automobile is actually made or sold on that street in New York 
City? The second is an objective approach, which inquires whether 
merchants are in fact selling any goods with qualities described by 
the term in question, or are they likely to do so in the foreseeable 
future. In the case of geographic terms, one would ask whether 
there are other merchants selling goods that in some way originate 
in or have significant commercial connection with the place named 
by the term, such that they might want to use that term to point 
out that connection. In other words, whether or not consumers 
would believe that PARK AVENUE provides information about the 
origin of the car, are there car manufacturers with some 
connection to Park Avenue, the street, that might want to use that 
term?112  
Current law on geographic marks is overwhelmingly focused 
on the subjective approach. In fact, the goods-place association test 
first announced in In re Nantucket113 is an unelaborated 
embodiment of the subjective approach: it asks the ultimate 
question of whether purchasers “would conclude that [a mark] 
imparts information about the geographic origin of the goods.”114 
As Judge Markey put it in the Nantucket case, the goods-place 
association issue is whether “the purchasing public would expect 
men’s shirts to have their origin in Nantucket when seen in the 
market place with NANTUCKET on them.”115  
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. Given that General Motors once occupied a 50-story skyscraper two blocks from 
Park Avenue, this is not as implausible as it might as first seem. 
 113. 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  
 114. In re House of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 53, 55 (T.T.A.B. 1983). 
 115. In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 101 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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For the most part, the TTAB and the Federal Circuit have 
insisted that trademark examining attorneys ask this basic 
question in every case, unaided by any more specific subsidiary 
rules. One way to focus the test, for example, would be to limit the 
inference only to those cases where the geographic locale specified 
by the mark is well known, famous for, or prominent in the 
production of the goods or services in question. A variation on this 
test might be to also allow an inference of goods-place association 
where the goods are not those for which the area is famous, but are 
“related” to such goods.116 
While this view has been advocated by at least one 
commentator,117 it was rejected by Judge Nies in her concurring 
opinion in Nantucket,118 and the post-Nantucket decisional law has 
consistently repudiated any such requirement.119 Thus, a goods-
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. In In re Save Venice New York Inc., 259 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001), an applicant 
sought to register a composite mark including the words THE VENICE COLLECTION and 
the traditional winged lion emblem of that city for a variety of goods, including potpourri, 
tableware, lamps, clocks, art prints, paper products, residential furniture, dinnerware, 
glassware, bedding, and carpets, none of which actually originated in Venice, Italy. The 
examining attorney denied the application after consulting an encyclopedia that revealed 
that “Venice, Italy is a location known for paper, publishing, printing, textiles, jewelry, art 
objects, glassmaking, housewares and lace” because “all of the applicant's claimed goods are 
associated with traditional Venetian products . . . related to the traditional crafts and 
industries of Venice [and] . . . part of a natural expansion of Venetian industries.” The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of registration, observing: 
In the modern marketing context, geographic regions that are noted for certain 
products or services actively promote and adapt their specialties to fit changing 
consumer needs. Thus we see no reason to believe that a modern merchant of Venice 
would not expand on the traditional Venetian products listed by the Board, to begin 
marketing products or services related to such goods. . . . [W]e hold that the 
registrability of a geographic mark may be measured against the public’s association 
of that region with both its traditional goods and any related goods or services that 
the public is likely to believe originate there. 
259 F.3d at 1355. Note that Save Venice does not hold that a finding of goods-place 
association requires that the goods are either the traditional goods of the named region or 
related to such goods. Rather, it says only that such facts are sufficient to permit the goods-
place inference. 
 117. John R. Renaud, Can’t Get There From Here: How NAFTA and GATT Have 
Reduced Protection for Geographical Trademarks, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1097, 1123 (2001). 
 118. “Neither this case nor any other cited by appellant provides authority for the 
principle that a place must be ‘noted for’ goods before use of its name as a mark will be held 
‘primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive.’” In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 105-06 
(Nies, J., concurring). 
 119. See, e.g., In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(USPTO may find “a goods-place association without any showing that the place is ‘well-
known’ or ‘noted’ for the goods in question”); In re Loew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 767 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“While the . . . precedent requires a goods/place association to support a 
refusal to register under § 2(e)(2), it does not follow that such association embraces only 
instances where the place is well-known or noted for the goods”); In re Jack’s Hi-Grade 
Foods, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 1028, 1029 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (“We see nothing in In re Nantucket,. . . 
or subsequent decisions dealing with this issue . . . which require[s], as applicant contends, 
that a showing be made that the particular geographical area . . . is well known or noted for 
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place association was found between the Mexican province of 
Durango and chewing tobacco,120 between the Cuban city of 
Havana and clothing and perfume,121 and between the city of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and computer systems,122 
notwithstanding that these locations are not particularly 
renowned for the types of goods in question. Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit has declared that “the goods-place association often 
requires little more than a showing that the consumer identifies 
the place as a known source of the product.”123  
On the other hand, the cases caution that a goods-place 
association cannot be found merely because the goods or services 
could possibly emanate from the place indicated by the mark. 
Thus, in refusing to find a goods-place association between the 
Italian city of Venice and canned foods, including lasagna and 
spaghetti, the TTAB observed that it was “unwilling to sustain the 
refusal to register in this case on the basis that Venice is a large 
Italian city that could, conceivably, be the source of a wide range of 
goods, including canned foods.”124  
The subjective approach embodied in the goods-place 
association test may seem plausible for at least two reasons. First, 
if consumers do not understand a trademark use of a geographic 
term as a claim of geographic origin, then there is little chance 
that the mark will deceive consumers about that origin. In other 
words, if consumers understand the use of NANTUCKET on shirts 
merely as an attempt to evoke images of seaside summer resorts 
and the clothing appropriate thereto, they will be neither surprised 
nor upset to learn that the shirts are not made on Nantucket 
Island.  
Second, and more important for our analysis, one might 
believe that if consumers do not understand the use of a toponym 
as a claim of geographic origin, then granting exclusive rights to 
that use does not harm competitors, even competitors located in 
the place named by the geographic term. Two arguments can be 
made in support of this conclusion. The first concerns the ability of 
                                                                                                                                         
 
producing” the goods in question); In re Broyhill Furniture Industries, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1511 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (“While Tuscany is apparently not famous or otherwise noted for its 
furniture, such is not a requirement in order for consumers to mistakenly believe that a 
goods/place association exists.”). See also Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 
§ 1210.04 (4th ed. 2005). 
 120. See In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 121. In re Boyd Gaming Corp., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944 (T.T.A.B. 2000). 
 122. In re Cambridge Digital Systems, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659 (T.T.A.B. 1986). The TTAB 
found it irrelevant that there are numerous other “Cambridges” besides the one in 
Massachusetts. 
 123. In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., 334 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 124. In re Venice Maid Co., 222 U.S.P.Q. 618, 619 (T.T.A.B. 1984). 
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competitors to make use of a location’s reputation. If consumers do 
not understand the use as a claim of geographic origin, then we 
can infer that the place named does not have a reputation for the 
goods or services in question. If the place has no reputation for the 
goods and services in question, then a grant of trademark rights in 
the place’s name to one firm does not deny firms located in that 
place an opportunity to take advantage of that reputation. In other 
words, if Nantucket Island were as famous for shirts as Florida is 
for oranges, a grant of trademark rights over NANTUCKET for 
shirts to one firm would likely cause another Nantucket Island 
shirtmaker great harm, because it would find it much more 
difficult to emphasize that it, too, was part of the famous 
Nantucket shirtmaking community. If, on the other hand, there is 
no famous Nantucket shirtmaking community, then no other 
Nantucket shirtmaker has lost an opportunity to publicize its 
membership in it. 
Another more radical argument denies any effect at all on a 
competitor’s ability to communicate geographic origin. If 
consumers do not understand the use of a geographical designation 
on a particular good or service as a claim of geographic origin, it is 
impossible for competitors to inform consumers of their location 
through such a use, and therefore a grant of exclusive rights in 
that use does not affect competitors at all. In other words, 
assuming that all consumers think that NANTUCKET for shirts is 
purely evocative, a shirtmaker on Nantucket Island would be 
unable to inform consumers of its location by branding its shirts 
NANTUCKET. That being the case, preventing the shirtmaker 
from so branding its shirts would not affect its ability to 
communicate its location to consumers. 
The problem with these arguments in favor of a subjective 
approach is that they assume that consumer understandings of 
geographic term uses are binary and stable. By “binary,” we mean 
that consumers are assumed to understand a use of a geographic 
term either as a literal claim of origin or as a purely metaphorical 
or evocative use. By “stable,” we mean that consumer 
understandings of geographic term uses are assumed not to change 
very quickly, and not to be susceptible to contextual influences. If 
consumer understandings were binary and stable in this sense, 
then a subjective approach might very well protect the interests of 
competitors in communicating information about product 
equivalence to their customers, because an account of how 
consumers currently understand a given use of a geographic term 
would indicate the limits of what it is possible to communicate 
through that use.  
We argue, however, that consumer understandings of 
geographic terms are actually neither binary nor stable. They are 
not binary because consumers often cannot form a judgment about 
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whether a use of a geographic term is a claim of origin, and the 
inability to form a judgment is a third possibility. They are not 
stable because they are in fact susceptible to fairly rapid change 
and to context. If consumer understandings are often uncertain 
and unstable, then we cannot rely on them as a measure of what 
commercial communication is possible, and of what trademark law 
should do to support that communication. Rather, to fully support 
commercial communication, we must look beyond current 
consumer understandings to the kind of communication that could 
and should be possible. This reveals the true appropriate role of an 
objective component of a test of whether and when geographic 
term uses should be protected as trademarks: not as an indirect 
measure of current consumer understanding, but as a measure of 
the possible understandings that trademark law should support.  
1. The Role of Uncertainty in Consumer Understandings 
of Geographic Term Uses 
For reasons we will explain below, we expect that when asked 
whether particular geographic marks convey locational 
information about the goods to which they are attached—the 
goods-place association question—the honest answer of most 
people with respect to many marks would be neither “yes” nor “no,” 
but simply “I don’t know.” In other words, most people would not 
be able to form any confident opinion whether the terms were 
descriptive or arbitrary, because they would have only the weakest 
of clues, and the clues that they had would be pulling them in both 
directions. In this case, what we might call a “perfectionist” 
subjective test, which seeks a “yes” or “no” answer in every case, 
simply breaks down. If we wanted to rescue the subjective 
approach, we would then be left with two basic alternatives. A 
“maximalist” subjective test would reject immediate registration 
only in those cases in which a majority of people answered “yes”; it 
would treat a “don’t know” answer as if it were a “no.” A 
“minimalist” subjective test would do the opposite: it would reject 
immediate registration except when a majority of people answered 
“no” because it would count a “don’t know” as a “yes.”  
Although the rhetoric of the current approach seems to be 
perfectionist, the reality seems to be maximalist. After all, the 
examining attorney bears the burden of demonstrating grounds for 
a refusal to register. If a finding of geographic descriptiveness or 
geographically deceptive misdescriptiveness requires affirmative 
evidence that consumers make a goods-place association, then the 
fact most consumers were unsure one way or the other about a 
particular use of a geographic term would require a finding that 
there was no goods-place association, and the use would not be 
geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive. 
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Although we have not attempted to conduct rigorous empirical 
research, it appears to us that such an approach has resulted in 
granting immediate registration to geographic marks on a very 
liberal basis. The Principal Register now sports recently issued 
registrations for MIAMI for bathroom fixtures,125 ALBANY for 
cookies,126 CAPE COD for bath and shower stalls,127 SANTA FE for 
barbecue grills,128 CHARLESTON for luggage,129 CHICAGO for 
water coolers130 and ashtrays,131 and TRENTON for kitchen 
cabinet doors132 and computers,133 none of which required any 
demonstration of secondary meaning. Yet it is not at all clear that 
a maximalist subjective approach, or the results that such an 
approach seems to generate, have any basis in sound trademark 
policy. 
Consider, first, why it is that the public will often be unable to 
form a judgment as to whether geographic marks are descriptive, 
and why this is likely to be a more severe problem with geographic 
marks than with non-geographic marks.134 We think that this 
stems both from differences in human knowledge about geographic 
and non-geographic facts, and from the particularly rich sets of 
associations that develop around place names.  
Consumers—and we count ourselves as consumers—draw on 
different bodies of knowledge when sorting geographic and non-
geographic terms into the categories of descriptive and arbitrary. 
For non-geographic terms, we draw on our knowledge of the 
ingredients, qualities, and uses of products and services. Take, for 
example, a common item like soap. It turns out that there is a list 
of dozens of things we know are likely ingredients, qualities, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2931903 (issued March 8, 2005) (applicant 
located in Deerfield Beach, Florida). 
 126. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2870486 (issued August 3, 2004) (applicant 
located in Missouri). 
 127. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2934137 (issued March 5, 2005) (applicant 
located in Wisconsin). 
 128. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2560346 (issued April 9, 2002) (applicant located 
in Georgia). 
 129. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2990475 (issued August 30, 2005) (applicant 
located in Colorado). 
 130. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2522695 (issued December 25, 2001) (applicant 
located in Canada).  
 131. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3009463 (issued October 25, 2005) (applicant 
located in California). 
 132. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2428875 (issued February 13, 2001) (applicant 
located in Florida). 
 133. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2581480 (issued June 18, 2002) (applicant located 
in New York). 
 134. The differences are differences of degree, not kind, so what we will have to say 
counsels against sole reliance on a subjective approach to non-geographic terms as well.  
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uses of soap. Here’s a start: “olive,” “palm,” “coconut,” “oatmeal,” 
“lavender,” “creamy,” “moisture,” “antibacterial,” “bubble,” “suds,” 
“facial,” “bath,” and “shower.” There is also a list of ingredients 
and qualities that we know are very unlikely to be connected with 
soap—a much, much longer list that contains thousands of items, 
given the great number and diversity of things in the world. Here 
are just a few of them: “ruby,” “platinum,” “insignia,” “sparrow,” 
“javelin,” “labyrinth,” “mixolydian,” “compass,” “prison,” “infinity,” 
“fuel,” “happy,” “ghostly,” and a famous example to which we will 
return, “ivory.” 
True, there are some things about which we might be unsure: 
for instance, the term “iron” used in connection with soap. Does it 
make sense for soap to contain iron? Iron is not expensive like 
platinum, and it is something we know human beings need as a 
nutrient, so maybe it does something for skin . . . or maybe not. It 
might turn out that as to some terms like this we cannot really 
form an opinion. However, the fact remains that with respect to 
most goods and services there are long lists of terms that are, in 
our minds, clearly related and clearly unrelated. This makes the 
task of categorizing non-geographic marks as either descriptive or 
non-descriptive relatively manageable. 
Now apply the same analysis to geographic terms. To classify 
geographic terms, we draw on our knowledge of places where goods 
are made or grown, and where services are performed. Where is 
soap made? It turns out that in our specialized, impersonal, 
international economy, consumers generally do not know much 
about where soap is made. Of course, there are a few terms that 
we can say are clearly geographically descriptive for soap. These 
include names of places that are famous for soap making,135 and 
references to regions of commercial activity large enough that it is 
virtually certain that soap is made in them (FRENCH, for 
example). And there are a few terms that are clearly 
nondescriptive or arbitrary—principally those referring to areas 
devoid of commercial activity, such as ANTARCTICA. However, 
the lists of clearly descriptive and arbitrary geographic terms are 
shorter than their non-geographic counterparts, particularly in the 
case of arbitrary terms—we know about thousands of things and 
concepts that have nothing to do with soap, but we do not know of 
thousands of places where we are sure soap is not made.  
That leaves the vast majority of geographic terms as neither 
clearly descriptive nor clearly arbitrary for soap. We do not have 
any particular reason to think that soap is made in Muskegon, or 
along the Danube River, or in Tierra del Fuego, but we do not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. Castile, a province in Spain, has lent its name to a type of soap, but the historical 
origins of the name are obscure. See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/castile_soap. 
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know that it is not, either.136 We may know a little more with 
respect to agricultural products, because they are more restricted 
by conditions of climate, but given the number of places in the 
world we know relatively little about, there will still be many 
geographic terms that are neither clearly descriptive nor clearly 
arbitrary with respect to agricultural products, as well. 
Consumers’ lack of knowledge about economic activity in 
particular areas around the world is one reason why they may not 
be able to form an opinion about the descriptiveness of a 
geographic term, but there is a second important reason. Many 
geographic terms have developed a rich set of connotations that 
make it easy to see why merchants would use them for reasons 
other than indicating geographic origin. If this evocative use 
foreclosed the possibility that a term was simultaneously being 
used to indicate geographic origin, then one might be able to 
conclude that the use was clearly non-descriptive.137 In fact, 
however, suggestive and descriptive uses of geographic terms can 
often coexist. When that is the case, the possibility of suggestive 
use is merely another cause for uncertainty about whether a 
geographic mark is being used to indicate origin. 
It may help to consider some examples. In In re Jacques 
Bernier, Inc.,138 the court considered the registrability of RODEO 
DRIVE as a mark for perfume. In holding that consumers would 
not make a goods-place association in that situation, the court 
observed in passing that “a geographic mark may indicate that a 
product is stylish or of high quality, i.e., HYDE PARK or 
NANTUCKET for clothing, and FIFTH AVENUE for a car.” In 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. Did you know that the third most important manufacturing activity in Ohio is the 
chemical industry, including soaps, paints, and varnishes? See http://www.netstate.com/ 
states/links/oh_links.htm. Does that mean that OHIO as a trademark for soap would 
engender a goods-place association? How about computer chips and New Mexico: 
The leading products of New Mexico’s manufacturing industries are computer and 
electronic equipment. Silicon computer chips are produced in the state making this 
sector worth about 80% of the manufacturing industry. 
See http://www.netstate.com/states/links/nm_links.htm. Breakfast cereals are big business 
in Nebraska. They are also big in Tennessee. Paper products are big in Alabama. They are 
also big in Maine. Other than junior high school students assigned to do oral reports on 
various state economies, it is not likely very many consumers know these bits of economic 
trivia. Or do they? Or does it matter that in-state consumers might know the information 
even if the rest of us do not? 
 137. When a geographic term is juxtaposed with another word, the resulting 
combination may lead readers away from interpreting the geographic term literally as a 
claim of origin. See, e.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916) 
(holding that the mark THE AMERICAN GIRL for shoes was not descriptive); Forschner 
Group v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that SWISS ARMY 
for knives was not geographically descriptive). This is one instance of the well-known 
maxim that composite marks must be viewed as a whole. See, e.g., California Cooler, Inc. v. 
Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 138. 894 F.2d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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other words, the court viewed these marks as suggestive of the 
exclusive or prestigious nature of the products to which they were 
attached.139 Moreover, high quality and stylishness are not the 
only connotation that can be suggested by a geographic term. 
There are many other types of product attributes that can be 
intimated by the clever selection of a geographic trademark.  
Thus, in the mid-nineties an applicant sought to register the 
mark HAIGHT ASHBURY (and design) for cigarette rolling 
papers.140 Haight Ashbury is, for younger readers, a neighborhood 
in San Francisco that achieved considerable fame in the 1960s as 
the center of “hippie” culture. It was an urban enclave with what 
might be characterized, with some understatement, as a tolerant 
attitude toward recreational drug use.141 It does not seem far 
fetched to assume that this particular place name trademark for 
rolling papers was suggestive of an attribute or use of the 
product—namely that it might be particularly useful for rolling not 
just cigarettes made of tobacco, but marijuana cigarettes as well. 
Consider also the mark VALLEY FORGE, which has been 
registered for flags and flagpoles.142 While that application was 
filed long before the Nantucket decision, the records of the USPTO 
reveal that the office did not demand any proof of secondary 
meaning, indicating that it did not view the mark as either 
geographically descriptive or misdescriptive, even though Valley 
Forge plainly has broad public recognition as a geographic location 
in Pennsylvania.143 That determination was presumably based on 
a conclusion that the use of mark referring to the location where 
George Washington wintered with his troops was suggestive of 
patriotism.  
In some industries this kind of metaphoric or suggestive use of 
geographic place names has become commonplace. Thus, in the 
automotive field, merchants use place names in the rugged 
mountain regions of North America to suggest vehicles that are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. In Nantucket itself, the court summarized the applicant’s argument as a claim that 
the mark should “be registrable for shirts as suggestive of fashionable summer resort 
stylishness, not of Nantucket as the source of shirts.” 677 F.2d at 101 n.10 (emphasis 
added). The court also cited the commentary to the first Restatement of Torts to the effect 
that “Ethiopian may be a proper trade-mark for ladies’ stockings; for, while suggestive of a 
certain color and sheen, it is only fancifully so and there is no likelihood that other 
merchants may have occasion properly to use the name Ethiopia on stockings since there is 
no factor of importance associating stockings with Ethiopia.” Id. at 100 n.8 (quoting 3 
Restatement of Torts § 720, comment d, at 578 (1938) (emphasis added). 
 140. U.S. Trademark Registration Application Ser. No. 74648092 (filed March 17, 1995; 
abandoned February 22, 1996). 
 141. See generally Charles Perry, The Haight-Ashbury: A History (1984). 
 142. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 740736 (issued November 13, 1962). 
 143. The registrant of this mark is located in Womelsdorf, Pennsylvania, a town west of 
the city of Reading, approximately 60 miles from Valley Forge. 
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suitable for rough terrain—YUKON, TAHOE, and SIERRA, for 
example—while using exclusive urban locations to suggest 
luxury—such as PARK AVENUE or NEW YORKER. In the 
restaurant field, place names are surrogates for types of cuisine. 
Thus the BARCELONA café is likely to feature tapas, gazpacho, 
and other Spanish or Catalan specialties, while the HUNAN 
TERRACE restaurant is likely to feature recipes from south-
central China.144 
It is, of course, elementary trademark doctrine that word 
marks can be classified along a continuum of distinctiveness, from 
arbitrary, through suggestive, to descriptive, and finally to generic, 
based on the amount of information they provide about the product 
or service to which they are attached.145 Thus, the mark SILKY 
would be arbitrary for batteries, suggestive for dairy products, and 
descriptive for men’s neckties. In terms of this taxonomy, VALLEY 
FORGE for flags and HAIGHT-ASHBURY for rolling papers 
appear to be “suggestive” by providing only a hint about the 
attributes of a product, but requiring some degree of consumer 
imagination or background knowledge before the connotations of 
patriotism and tolerance of drug use will be appreciated. Does that 
mean that they cannot simultaneously describe geographic origin? 
No, because once again, geographic terms are substantially 
different from non-geographic terms. 
Geographic terms are capable of imparting two “packets” of 
information at once. When attached to a product or service (or for 
that matter to a person or animal), they can communicate data 
about the geographic origin of the product or service, while at the 
same time communicating information about the qualities of the 
product or service. We can call the former type of information 
“locational” and the latter type “trait-related.” The trait-related 
information usually requires some mental steps to deduce. Thus, 
as a signifier of traits, a geographic term will often be suggestive 
in the usual typology of trademark law. However, in terms of 
locational information, the same term can simultaneously provide 
straightforward information about where the product comes from. 
In this sense, the term is (geographically) descriptive. Thus, 
toponyms are often simultaneously suggestive and descriptive.146  
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. In recognition of this practice, one court held recently that POSITANO for an 
Italian restaurant was descriptive and hence unprotectible without a showing of secondary 
meaning. It noted that there were more than 20 unrelated restaurants with that name in 
the United States, and decided that “the names of these establishments describe the Italian 
cuisine they offer to their customers.” See Lamberti v. Positano Ristorante, Inc., 75 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1426 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 145. See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976); 2 McCarthy, supra note 6, § 11:1.  
 146. Geographic terms are not quite unique in this regard. Take, for example, the word 
“golden,” as used in marks like GOLDEN OREO, U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2961410 
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 In some cases the two types of information communicated by 
the mark stand in an inverse relationship—either providing a 
great deal of locational information and little trait-related 
suggestions, or vice versa. Indeed, if the mark communicates only 
a small amount of useful locational information about the products 
involved, that may, in turn, encourage consumers to search for a 
more metaphoric, trait-related meaning in the mark. For instance, 
the geographic information of the mark MOUNT EVEREST for 
bottled water would likely cause most consumers to conclude that 
in terms of locational information, the mark is a non-sequitur. 
There are unlikely to be bottling plants on that mountain, and it is 
unlikely to be commercially feasible to ship water from such an 
inaccessible location. That would prompt them to search for 
alternative meaning in the mark, and might generate suggestions 
of clear, pure, and frosty cold glaciers. In other cases, however, the 
two types of information may be in a direct or reinforcing 
relationship. The mark GENEVA on a watch both strongly 
communicates that it is made in the Swiss city of that name, and 
simultaneously strongly communicates high quality and 
meticulous craftsmanship because of the Swiss tradition of fine 
watchmaking. 
This latter situation may actually have been the one the court 
confronted in Nantucket. The word Nantucket connected to shirts 
suggests trait-related information about the shirts—perhaps that 
they are stylish, or that they have a nautical look, or, as one of our 
students put it, that they are “yachty.” At the same time, the word 
inevitably seems to describe the locational origin of the shirt. 
Asked where NANTUCKET brand shirts come from or where they 
can be bought, it is a fair assumption that a significant number of 
consumers would give the obvious answer and say “Nantucket.” 
Thus, although Nantucket, Inc. argued that NANTUCKET “should 
. . . be registrable for shirts as suggestive of fashionable summer 
                                                                                                                                         
 
(issued June 7, 2005). In the case of GOLDEN OREO, “golden” is undoubtedly being used to 
describe the color of the cookie, but there is a reason why Kraft did not choose “tan,” “beige,” 
or “light brown” to describe that color, even though as descriptors those words are at least 
as good. Kraft also likely wanted the connotation of “precious,” and all of the other positive 
connotations of the word “golden.” So in this case the word “golden” is suggestive as well as 
descriptive.  
That having been said, however, geographic terms are typically far more susceptible 
to such dual use or significance than are other descriptive words, for two reasons. First, the 
suggestive meanings linked with geographic terms are typically much deeper and richer 
than those linked with other types of descriptive words because of the long histories of and 
diverse activities connected with many places. (It seems unlikely, for example, that any non-
geographic term describing crêpes, even “golden” crêpes, could call to mind the set of rich 
associations that “Parisian” crêpes does.) Second, since many kinds of goods and services 
can originate from a place, toponyms can be descriptive of many more goods and services 
that most other types of descriptive words. 
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resort stylishness, not of Nantucket as the source of shirts,”147 the 
term can communicate both things at once, and giving Nantucket, 
Inc. the exclusive right to use the term for shirts makes it more 
difficult for co-located competitors to communicate their location.  
In sum, the subjective approach embodied in the goods-place 
association test often leads to inconclusive results because 
consumers often are unable to form any definite opinion on 
whether a brand name is providing them with information about 
the geographic origin of a good or service. They are unable to do so 
for two reasons. First, they know very little about economic 
activity in many parts of the world. Second, they are aware that 
the rich sets of connotations of many geographic terms provide 
merchants with other reasons to use the terms, but do not foreclose 
simultaneous use to designate origin. Consequently, a rule of law 
that commands trademark examining attorneys and judges to 
deduce consumer opinions on the subject effectively commands 
them to do the impossible and therefore to simply resolve cases 
based on a guess. 
2. The Role of Instability in Consumer Understandings 
of Geographic Term Uses 
If consumer understandings of geographic term uses are often 
uncertain, they are also often unstable. That is to say, they are 
subject to fairly rapid change, depending upon other information 
that consumers receive. Of course, existing law recognizes, for 
some purposes, the influence of context on consumer 
understanding. For example, to determine whether a geographic 
term use creates a goods-place association, the Trademark Manual 
of Examining Procedure instructs examining attorneys to “examine 
the specimen(s) and any other evidence in the record that shows 
the context in which the applicant’s mark is used.”148 Apparently, 
the notion here is that labels or promotional materials can foster a 
goods-place association by touting the virtues of the product and 
by linking them to attributes of the locality specified in the mark. 
Thus, when in In re Nantucket Allserve, Inc.149 an applicant with 
corporate offices on Nantucket Island sought to register the mark 
NANTUCKET NECTARS for soft drink products, the TTAB found 
it probative of descriptiveness that the product labels contained a 
map of the island of Nantucket and recited that the goods were 
“born” there and embodied “the wholesome quality of the Island 
whose name they bear.”150 Similarly, in In re Broyhill Furniture 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 101 n.10. 
 148. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1210.04 (4th ed. 2005). 
 149. 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1144 (T.T.A.B. 1993). 
 150. In re Nantucket Allserve, Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1144 (T.T.A.B. 1993).  
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Industries, Inc.,151 the TTAB found that the applicant’s reference 
in its catalog to “Europe’s Mediterranean Coast” and “European 
sensibility” supported a goods-place association between its 
TOSCANA furniture and Tuscany, which meant that its use was 
deceptively misdescriptive since the furniture was made in North 
Carolina.152  
While the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure and the 
Nantucket Allserve and Broyhill Furniture cases do recognize the 
susceptibility of consumer understandings to the influence of 
context, they do not go nearly far enough. Their focus on the 
trademark applicant’s conduct may be appropriate if the only 
concern is consumer deception. However, if the concern is about 
potential burden on competitors, the important insight to be 
gained about context is not about what the trademark applicant 
has done, but what the applicant’s competitors could do. Return, 
for a moment, to the In re Nantucket case, concerning shirts 
branded with the name of the same island as the drinks in 
Nantucket Allserve. Suppose that a consumer survey shows that 
most consumers would understand NANTUCKET for shirts, 
without any other context, as purely evocative rather than as a 
claim of geographic origin. If a shirt maker from Nantucket Island 
wanted to tout the virtues of shirts actually originating on the 
island, would that consumer understanding prove to be an 
insurmountable obstacle? Since Nantucket Island has no greater 
historical connection to drinks than to shirts, we think Nantucket 
Allserve suggests that it would not be a serious obstacle at all. One 
can easily imagine a marketing campaign that would link the 
sturdiness of the shirts to the skill of those who sewed nets for 
Nantucket fishermen: “Nantucket Islanders sewed nets that 
whales couldn’t break: Our clothing is just as sturdy.” Add a map 
of Nantucket Island and a statement like, “Proudly made at the 
port of call of half the world’s whaling ships,” and consumer 
understandings would quickly change. Having mounted such a 
marketing campaign, the shirt maker could then use 
NANTUCKET for shirts, even in isolation, to remind consumers of 
the virtues of that geographic origin. 
Suppose, however, that a trademark registration for 
NANTUCKET for shirts is granted immediately upon first use to 
one merchant, perhaps as in In re Nantucket itself to a merchant 
not located on Nantucket Island, on the ground that that 
merchant’s use would be understood by consumers as purely 
evocative. That registration suddenly makes it much more difficult 
for any merchants who actually make shirts on Nantucket Island 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1511 (T.T.A.B. 2001). 
 152. Id. at 1517. 
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to instruct consumers about the virtues of that geographic origin. 
An overly prominent use of the term “Nantucket” will subject those 
merchants to the risk of a trademark infringement suit, and 
although they can take advantage of the descriptive fair use 
defense, that defense will likely not work if their touting of the 
virtues of Nantucket causes any substantial number of consumers 
to confuse their goods with the registrant’s.153  
In the recent case of In re Glaze, Inc.,154 for example, the TTAB 
reversed an examiner’s refusal to register SWISSCELL for 
batteries made in New Jersey as being primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive (PGDM). Although the examining 
attorney produced evidence that at least two companies actually 
made batteries in Switzerland and that both of those firms touted 
their “Swiss quality,” the TTAB found that this was “tenuous 
evidence that purchasers would expect batteries for lighting to 
come from Switzerland,”155 and hence insufficient to support a 
finding of a goods-place association. The result of the reversal, 
however, was the immediate registration of SWISSCELL for 
batteries, even though that registration will make it risky for 
companies that actually make batteries in Switzerland to 
prominently advertise their origin.156  
Thus, given the instability of consumer understandings of 
geographic term uses, as well as their frequent uncertainty, it does 
not make sense to limit our inquiry to current understandings of 
an applicant’s own use when assessing whether a grant of 
trademark rights over that use would unduly burden commercial 
communications. Rather, to assess that burden, we would need to 
know how likely it is that other merchants would have occasion to 
use the geographic term in question in its literal sense, as a 
designation of the geographic origin of similar goods or services. 
That likelihood will be related to some objective measure—to 
whether there are merchants selling the goods in question in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 154. 2005 WL 847417 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2005). 
 155. Id. at *3. The application was originally filed as an intent-to-use application under 
Section 1(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b); now that the applicant is selling 
batteries under the mark SWISSCELL, it has chosen to further strengthen the mark’s 
reference to Switzerland by displaying a slightly modified Swiss flag on the battery 
packaging. See http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2005/03/ttab-reverses-2e3-refusal-of-swisscell. 
html (visited on March 17, 2006) (displaying a photograph of the packaging). This is not 
discussed in the TTAB opinion, presumably either because the packaging had not yet been 
designed, or because it was not brought to the attention of the TTAB.  
 156. One such company that the examining attorney did not find is a firm based in 
Switzerland that sells batteries in many European countries under the mark SWISS 
BATTERIES. See http://www.swissbatteries.com. One would have to presume that this 
company would be subject to an infringement suit by New Jersey-based Glaze, Inc. if it ever 
tried to market those batteries in the United States.  
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location in question, for example, or whether it would be possible 
for the goods in question to originate in that location. Thus, we 
now turn to the issues of whether the Lanham Act would allow for 
an objective component, and what that objective component should 
be.  
3. Assessing an Objective Approach 
If our goal is to ensure that competitors who want to 
communicate the geographic origin of their goods remain free to do 
so, it seems roundabout and unproductive to speculate about how 
consumers react to toponymic marks. We argue that it would be 
far more sensible simply to ask whether there are competitors 
located in the place designated by that mark who might also want 
to use that designation. Current law on geographic descriptiveness 
arguably contains one rule that addresses this question, but it does 
so indirectly and incompletely. 
It is well established in case law that the USPTO should 
consider where the applicant’s business is located in order to 
determine if there is a goods-place association. For instance, in In 
re JT Tobacconists,157 an applicant based in Minnetonka, 
Minnesota, sought to register the mark MINNESOTA CIGAR 
COMPANY for, not surprisingly, cigars and humidors. The 
examining attorney denied registration, and the TTAB affirmed, 
noting that “a public association of the goods or services with the 
place may ordinarily be presumed from the fact that the 
applicant's goods or services come from the geographic place 
named in the mark.”158 
If this presumption is supposed to be based on the assumption 
that consumers know where businesses are actually located—the 
purported subjective question that is at the center of existing 
doctrine—it seems highly doubtful. As we have argued above, in 
our current international and impersonal economy, most 
consumers will have no information at all about where a vendor is 
located—except the information that may or may not be provided 
by the trademark. There is no reason to think that consumers are 
any more likely to make a goods-place association between 
“Minnesota” and cigars than they are between “Chicago” and 
ashtrays.159 The fact that in one case the vendor is located in 
Minnesota, while in the other it is not located in Chicago, would 
seem to be quite irrelevant to the subjective perceptions of 
consumers who are located in places like New York and California. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2001). 
 158. Id. at 1082. See also In re California Pizza Kitchen, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704, 1705 
(T.T.A.B. 1988); In re Handler Fenton Westerns, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. 848, 850 (T.T.A.B. 1982). 
 159. See supra note 131. 
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To be fair, some small number of consumers who live or work 
in the immediate proximity of the vendor might know of its 
existence. People living in Minnetonka, Minnesota, may be aware 
that there is a cigar company there, and thus be more likely to 
make a goods-place association if they subsequently see cigars 
labeled MINNESOTA. However, they are likely to constitute only 
a tiny fraction of all consumers. Moreover, it is more than a little 
circular to reason that consumers will make a goods-place 
association based on the mark because they are already familiar 
with the existence and location of the vendor. 
a. The Objective Approach and 
Geographically Descriptive Marks 
Consider, first, the situation in which an applicant is located 
in the place named by a term used in its mark, that is, in which 
the mark is arguably descriptive (not deceptively misdescriptive or 
deceptive). Perhaps the justification for according weight to the 
location of the applicant’s business is not so much an inference 
about consumer perception as it is about the communicative needs 
of competitors. If the applicant is located in the specified place, 
that shows, by definition, that at least one business selling the 
specified type of goods could be based in the place. In turn, that 
suggests that other businesses selling those same types of goods 
might quite likely be located there, as well. Thus, we might want 
to hesitate before granting any one firm exclusive rights in the 
location name, lest we handicap co-located competitors. 
To return to the example, if a firm in Minnetonka seeks to 
register MINNESOTA for cigars, its very existence suggests that 
other cigar companies may be nearby and may also want to use the 
name. In this case, a finding that the mark is primarily 
geographically descriptive is not really a finding about a consumer 
goods-place association, but really a judgment that the need to 
safeguard the interests of competitors makes it advisable to delay 
protection and registration of the mark.  
Arguably, when an applicant is located in the place named by 
the mark, the purpose of preserving competitor access to 
descriptive terms would be well served by an objective test 
regardless of whether the place is famous for the goods in question. 
If the place is famous for the products in question, then there will 
almost always be other firms making similar products in the same 
area. If it is famous and there are no competitors, then either the 
applicant should be able to show secondary meaning (because it is 
responsible for the fame),160 or the applicant is not dependent on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. For example, if Pendleton, Oregon, is famous for wool cloth and clothing, it is 
because of the activities of a single company, Pendleton Woolen Mills, which could then 
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trademark law to protect the designation, because it is the only 
producer in the area due to its ownership of land or possession of a 
state-granted monopoly, and can sue others who use the 
designation for false advertising rather than use of a false 
designation of origin.161 
If the place is not known for the goods in question, but there is 
in fact more than one producer of those goods in that place, it 
seems contrary to basic trademark principles to give immediate 
exclusive rights to the first co-located competitor that uses or 
applies to register the name of the place. The fact that at the time 
of first use or registration application most consumers are not 
aware that several firms making competing products are located in 
a particular place—and hence make no goods-place association—
does not foreclose the possibility that more than one of those firms 
might want to use the place name as part of their branding 
strategy. If, in fact, none of the other co-located firms are 
interested in branding their goods with a reference to their 
location, then one firm is free to develop and seek protection on the 
basis of secondary meaning.162  
                                                                                                                                         
 
register the mark PENDLETON by demonstrating secondary meaning. See U.S. Trademark 
Registration No. 0508995 (issued April 26, 1949) (PENDLETON in stylized form for 
clothing, issued under Lanham Act § 2(f)). 
 161. For example, the Saratoga Spring Water Co. presumably owns the land where the 
Saratoga Springs are located. Even though it could not register the trademark SARATOGA 
SPRING WATER before showing secondary meaning, see U.S. Trademark Registration No. 
2129959 (issued January 20, 1998), it could prevent others from using that name if the 
water sold by the others did not come from Saratoga Springs. See Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. 
Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the plaintiff, 
located in the Black Hills, could obtain injunction under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a), to prevent another company located outside the area from using the 
phrases “Black Hills Gold” and Black Hills Gold Jewelry” in conjunction with its jewelry); cf. 
La Republique Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Springs, 107 F. 459, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1901) 
(holding that defendant could not market water under the name SARATOGA VICHY 
SPRINGS because it might lead some consumers to think that the water came from Vichy, 
France).  
 162. Although the rule that descriptive but obscure foreign place names can be 
registered immediately predates In re Nantucket and seems to be one of the least 
controversial of applications of the subjective approach, it also seems susceptible of 
criticism, or at least reframing. That rule has been developed in ex parte registration 
proceedings like In re Brauerei Franz Inselkammer KG and In re Bavaria St. Pauli Brauerei 
AG, see supra note 34, and in fact, there probably were no competing breweries in the towns 
of Jever or Aying, Germany, to bring opposition proceedings. But what if there were a 
competing brewery in one of those cases, and it filed an opposition? Should that opposition 
be denied on the ground that very few members of the American public knew of the town at 
the time the opposition was brought? If so, the denial of the opposition would indicate a 
refusal to take into account a very near future in which the town might become better 
known due to the marketing efforts of the two breweries. Thus, if changed political or 
economic conditions were going to make substantial export of goods from a foreign region to 
the United States practical for the first time, one firm could get immediate U.S. trademark 
rights to the name of the region, even if the region were known in the foreign country for the 
type of goods in question and more than one firm in that region produced those goods. In 
such cases, delaying the grant of trademark rights until one of the firms could prove 
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Finally, there is another reason why objectivity seems 
warranted when the applicant is located in the place indicated by 
the mark. If we put aside both the enchantment with goods-place 
association and the consideration of competitor need to 
communicate and simply ask what it means to be “geographically 
descriptive,” the most natural construction is that it is a matter of 
objective fact. If the applicant is located in the place indicated by 
the mark, then the mark describes the location of the applicant, 
and it does that even if some people do not realize it does, or if the 
applicant has no co-located competitors. This would also seem to be 
consistent with the most natural construction of “(non-
geographically) descriptive.” To hark back to an earlier example, if 
an applicant’s soap contains any substantial amount of iron, then 
IRON would seem to be descriptive of that soap, regardless of 
whether some people do not realize the soap contains iron or 
whether competitors’ soap also contains iron.  
b. The Objective Approach and 
Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks 
Under the Original Lanham Act 
Taking our examination of an objective approach one step 
further, why not ask whether there are actually firms in the place 
indicated by the mark even when the applicant is not from that 
place? There is no reason to assume that competitor need is any 
less compelling in such a case. In other words, if the applicant in 
JT Tobacconists had been based in Delaware, that would hardly be 
probative of an absence of cigar companies in Minnesota. However, 
allowing immediate registration solely on the strength of a 
subjective test showing the lack of a goods-place association 
between cigars and Minnesota would seem to run a serious risk of 
burdening competitors without conducting even a basic factual 
investigation.163 
                                                                                                                                         
 
secondary meaning in the United States would seem to best promote the pro-competitive 
purposes of U.S. trademark law.  
It may be that the courts in the Franz Inselkammer and Bavaria St. Pauli cases 
simply did not consider the possibility of competitor need because there was no evidence of 
co-located competitors and the applicants both already had foreign registrations. In fact, the 
grant of immediate rights might be particularly questionable when the U.S. application was 
filed on the basis of a foreign registration, since the U.S. registration could then issue 
without the applicant’s having ever distributed its goods in the United States, allowing even 
more anticompetitive maneuvers. Of course, the fact that a firm is able to get a foreign 
registration for the name of the place in which it is located may be evidence that there are 
no competing firms in that place, but that depends on the trademark law of that foreign 
country, which may not promote competition in the same way that U.S. law does. 
 163. The hypothetical in the text is not purely speculative. Browsing the records of the 
USPTO reveals a registration for the mark MINNESOTA MUNCHERS for cookies. The 
owner is a corporation with an address in Greendale, Wisconsin (a suburb of Milwaukee). 
Apparently the mark was registered without any demand for proof of secondary meaning 
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Although the addition of an objective element has much to 
recommend it in these situations as well, the analysis of such 
situations—situations in which the goods or services do not come 
from the place indicated by the mark—is admittedly more 
complicated.  
The first complication comes from confusion over the role of 
protecting consumers against deception in this area of the law. As 
long as we are dealing with cases in which the goods or services 
come from the place indicated by the mark, protecting against 
deception is not a reason for withholding exclusive rights in the 
mark because the mark is conveying accurate information. When 
they do not, however, protecting consumers from deception 
becomes a plausible goal. More importantly, if the decision 
whether or not to protect or register a mark is solely a matter of 
guarding against deception, then a subjective approach seems 
most appropriate. Consumers can only be deceived about 
geographic origin by a mark if they think that it is in fact 
conveying locational information. If they do not think so, such 
deception is not possible. Whether or not competitors exist in the 
place named seems irrelevant.  
There are very strong reasons, however, to think that the 
Lanham Act as originally enacted strictly separated consumer 
deception concerns from concerns about fair competition and 
competitor communication, by making the former the subject of 
Section 2(a)’s permanent ban on registration of marks containing 
“deceptive matter” and the latter the subject of Section 2(e)’s 
temporary ban on registration of marks that are “merely 
deceptively misdescriptive” or “primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive.” 
The strongest reason for drawing this distinction is that the 
consequences of having a mark classified as “merely deceptively 
misdescriptive” or as “primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive” were exactly the same as those of having a mark 
classified as “merely descriptive” or “primarily geographically 
descriptive.” In either case, the mark could not be immediately 
registered, but could be registered once an applicant could prove 
secondary meaning. By contrast, when a mark was deemed 
“deceptive” under Section 2(a), the consequences were dramatically 
                                                                                                                                         
 
and without any requirement that the applicant disclaim the word “Minnesota” in the mark. 
See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2556003 (issued April 2, 2002). The common-sense 
intuition that there are cookie vendors located in Minnesota can be confirmed in a 15-second 
Internet search that reveals firms such as the Classic Cookie Company, the Cookie Cart, the 
Cookie Corner, and Cookies & More, all in Minneapolis. Moreover, further searching reveals 
that “Minnesota munchers” appears to be the common descriptive name for a type of cookie, 
see, for example, http://www.christmas-cookies.com/recipes/recipe235. minnesotamunchers. 
html, suggesting that the USPTO may have allowed this applicant to register a generic 
designation for a type of cookie. 
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different. A Section 2(a) “deceptive” mark could never be entered 
on the Principal or the Supplemental Register, and its registration 
could be challenged in a cancellation action at any time, whereas 
cancellation actions against marks registered under Section 2(e) 
can only be brought within the first five years after the mark is 
registered.164 In other words, before the NAFTA Implementation 
Act, Section 2(e) was completely indifferent about whether a term 
describes or “deceptively misdescribes” qualities of a good or 
service. It is difficult to see how one could attribute a consumer 
protection purpose to the original version of Section 2(e) when it 
took no account of the one distinction that is essential to protecting 
consumers against deception: the distinction between true 
descriptions and false ones.165  
The legislative history of the Lanham Act also suggests that 
the phrase “deceptively misdescriptive” was drafted to preserve the 
common-law rule of immediate protection for arbitrary and 
fanciful marks, rather than out of a new concern for consumer 
protection. An early draft of what became the Lanham Act 
proposed to direct an examining attorney to reject registration of a 
mark that “when applied to the goods of an applicant is merely 
descriptive or misdescriptive of them,” unless, of course, that mark 
had become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.” 
However, the term “misdescriptive” could be construed to refer not 
only to plausible yet inaccurate marks, but also to arbitrary marks 
as well, as is evident from this crucial exchange in a committee 
hearing on the draft: 
Mr. MARTIN. . . . Usually a misdescriptive term is 
registrable on that ground, that it is misdescriptive. . . . 
Mr. THOMAS E. ROBERTSON. You mean the misdescriptive 
term is registrable, if not deceptive? 
Mr. MARTIN. That is right. 
Mr. POHL. Right. 
Mr. ROGERS. As an illustration, “ivory” as applied to soap. 
It is a perfectly good trade-mark; but it is a descriptive term, 
but not as applied to soap. . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(1), 1064(3). The five-year limitation appears to apply to 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks after the NAFTA amendments, 
since they are not mentioned by name or section number in 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  
 165. In addition, the other prohibitions in the original version of Section 2(a) are 
similarly concerned with the interests of the general public rather than with those of 
competitors. It is members of the general public, rather than competitors, who might be 
injured by “immoral,” “scandalous,” or “disparag[ing]” marks, or marks that falsely suggest 
that the mark owner has some connection with people, beliefs, or institutions. By contrast, 
the other prohibition in the original version of Section 2(e)—the ban on immediate 
registration of marks that are primarily merely surnames—protects other merchants who 
bear that surname. 
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Mr. POHL. I agree with Mr. Rogers. . . . Now the reason that 
no mark which when applied to the goods is merely descriptive 
is registrable should be obvious. Everyone should be free to 
use the descriptive words, because they are indispensable. 
There is no exclusive right in them. Such terms should be 
given to anyone, and I refer to Mr. Rogers’ illustration. Now, 
ivory is descriptive only with respect to the tusks of the 
elephant. Ivory is only descriptive with respect to ivory. When 
applied to soap it is perfectly registrable although it is 
misdescriptive. But the ivory for soap is certainly not 
descriptive of soap. It is misdescriptive of soap, but it is not 
deceptive.166  
A few minutes after the quoted exchange, the committee 
settled on the adverb “deceptively.”167 It decided to amend the draft 
so that the formulation to describe both geographic and non-
geographic terms that were not to be registrable without secondary 
meaning became “descriptive and deceptively misdescriptive.” 
That formulation survived five more years of wrangling over 
trademark law revisions, was passed into law as part of the 
Lanham Act, and remains law today, 60 years later. 
Needless to say, the committee’s choice was infelicitous, 
because as we have noted, the Lanham Act also includes a 
permanent ban on marks consisting of or comprising “deceptive” 
matter in Section 2(a). The close linguistic relationship between 
the adverb “deceptively” and the adjective “deceptive” has led to 60 
years of ruminations on the exact relationship of Section 2(e) to 
Section 2(a). We think the best conclusion is that the adverb and 
the adjective are two different words being used to do two different 
things. The phrases “descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive” and 
“geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive” in 
Section 2(e) create categories of terms and devices that should be 
available to competitors. The reason that they should be available 
is that they describe some quality of the type of good or service that 
is the subject of competition, whether or not the applicant’s 
particular good or service in fact has that quality. Only terms that 
are unrelated to the type of good or service in question should be 
immediately registrable because they are not needed by 
competitors. As Mr. Pohl stated in the committee hearing, “Ivory” 
should be immediately registrable as applied to soap, because so 
applied it is not one of those “indispensable” words that 
“[e]veryone should be free to use.”168 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks 
of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85 (1941). 
 167. See id. at 86. 
 168. Id. at 85. 
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The appropriateness of an objective element in determining 
whether a mark is “deceptively misdescriptive” is perhaps most 
readily apparent in the case of non-geographic marks. Consider, 
again, the example of IRON for soap, and assume that the soap 
made by the firm applying to register IRON for soap does not 
contain any iron. One could survey consumers, trying to elicit their 
subjective beliefs about whether a soap named IRON would 
contain any iron or not. As we have suggested, however, we think 
that whatever those subjective beliefs would turn out to be, they 
would be quite weak. Consumers do not have very strong reasons 
to form a belief one way or the other. In that case, it seems 
appropriate and useful to ask whether any soap made by 
competitors contains substantial amounts of iron. If it does, that is 
a good reason for denying immediate protection and registration. 
The applicant should be put to the test of secondary meaning 
before being granted exclusive rights in a mark that describes a 
feature of a competitor’s product, whether the public is aware of it 
or not. Conversely, if no soap made by any soap manufacturer 
contains substantial amounts of iron, there does not seem to be 
any reason not to grant immediate protection to IRON for soap.  
What about geographic marks? At the very least, a positive 
result of an objective test should also be conclusive of geographic 
deceptive misdescriptiveness under the original Lanham Act. That 
is, if a soap-making firm not located in Muskegon wants to protect 
and register the mark MUSKEGON for soap, and another firm 
located in Muskegon makes soap, the first firm should be denied 
immediate protection and registration. One way to think of the 
justification for this rule is this: whenever the results of a 
subjective test would differ from this objective test, to choose the 
subjective test would be to allow consumer ignorance to make it 
more difficult for merchants to inform consumers of the truth. 
Surely this cannot be the goal of trademark law. 
Thus, ideally, we would recommend the express addition of an 
objective component to the test for both geographic descriptiveness 
and deceptive misdescriptiveness. If a firm seeks to register a 
recognizable geographic place name, and there are other firms 
located in the named place engaged in the same line of commerce, 
immediate protection should be denied. If, after sufficient time has 
passed, none of those competitors have made use of the mark, it 
seems safe to assume that it does not communicate any 
commercially relevant information, and it will then be time enough 
to grant the first user legal exclusivity. The goal here is simply to 
maximize the chance that words and devices that might be needed 
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by competitors are subject to the additional test of secondary 
meaning.169  
Although this may be the ideal, it is no longer possible to 
implement that ideal simply through judicial interpretation of the 
Lanham Act. In 1993, the NAFTA Implementation Act drastically 
changed the treatment of trademarks that designate places other 
than those from which the goods in question originate, and 
eliminated the role of secondary meaning in screening those 
marks. It did so supposedly to comply with NAFTA and TRIPS 
obligations to protect geographical indications. Thus, we turn to 
the impact of the NAFTA and TRIPS treaties and the NAFTA 
Implementation Act, and to what should be done in light of them. 
IV. GEOGRAPHIC MARKS AFTER NAFTA AND TRIPS: 
MAKING ROOM FOR COMPETITOR COMMUNICATION 
AND SECONDARY MEANING 
In 1993, the NAFTA Implementation Act, as noted above, 
uncoupled the category of PGDM marks from that of “primarily 
geographically descriptive” ones and provided that the former 
could no longer be salvaged by proof of secondary meaning.170 
Thus, after the NAFTA Implementation Act, trademark protection 
for geographic terms that name a place in which the goods at issue 
do not originate is an all-or-nothing, now-or-never matter. There is 
no possibility of waiting to see whether secondary meaning will 
develop. Rather, in deciding how to interpret the PGDM standard, 
courts must fix a line that determines whether the applicant will 
be able to register immediately or will be barred forever. In 
making individual determinations, examining attorneys and courts 
face the same now-or-never choice. Removal of the intermediate 
category has two unfortunate effects. First, it increases the 
damage done by any individual mistaken classification. Second, 
and more importantly, it may put pressure on a court to move the 
line in one direction or the other because of the drastic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. The European Court of Justice, interpreting the European Trademark Directive, 
has adopted an objective test related to the one we propose, asking whether a geographic 
name “is liable to be used in the future by the undertakings concerned as an indication of 
the geographical origin of that category of goods.” Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und 
Vertriebs GmbH v. Boots-  und Segelzubehor Walter Huber & Franz Attenberger, C-108/97 & 
C-109/97, [1999] ECR I-2779, I-2832 (interpreting Article 3(1)(c) of the First Council 
Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Trade Marks). The particular test we advocate in this piece calls not for a 
prediction of the future, but for present fact: are there co-located competitors or not? It may 
be less subtle than the ECJ test, but we think it has the virtue of relative administrative 
simplicity. 
 170. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 333(a)(2), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2(e)(3), 2(f)). 
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consequences at stake. In fact, it seems to have motivated the 
Federal Circuit to significantly raise the bar for challenging 
registrations of geographically misdescriptive marks. Although 
this avoids undue expansion of the category of permanently barred 
marks, it allows one company to get immediate exclusive rights in 
a geographical designation that other companies may legitimately 
need, and may even create incentives for them to do so in order to 
burden competitors.  
Our task in this section is twofold: to consider what Congress 
actually did in the NAFTA Implementation Act, and to consider 
what it could do under the NAFTA and TRIPS treaties. We 
conclude, contrary to Federal Circuit case law, that Congress did 
not add a materiality test to the conditions for a mark to be 
classified as PGDM. Rather, it seems clear that its 1993 action 
permanently barred from registration all geographic marks that 
give rise to an inaccurate goods-place association. Just as 
importantly, however, we conclude that Congress need not have 
gone that far to implement the NAFTA and TRIPS treaties. A 
NAFTA- and TRIPS-compliant law, we argue, need not 
permanently ban all marks giving rise to inaccurate goods-place 
associations. Such a law may instead impose a second condition, 
namely, that goods that actually come from the place designated 
by the challenged mark have specific characteristics that are 
attributable to their geographic origin, or that the designated place 
be famous for the type of goods in question. That second condition 
significantly narrows the category of permanently banned marks. 
A law that permanently banned only marks satisfying both the 
first and the second condition could preserve sufficient room for an 
intermediate category of geographically inaccurate marks 
registrable only upon proof of secondary meaning. We will argue 
that the ideal law would do just that. 
A. What the NAFTA Implementation Act Did 
If it is clear that Congress removed some geographic 
trademarks from a category in which they were subject to a 
secondary meaning test, it is not quite as clear where Congress put 
the marks it removed from that category. A strict textual approach 
would suggest that Congress simply put those marks in a category 
that made them permanently unregistrable. After all, the relevant 
section of the NAFTA Implementation Act makes no change to the 
previously existing phrase “primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive,” but simply isolates that phrase in a subsection, 
and then makes that subsection an exception to the rule that 
secondary meaning can cure rejections for descriptiveness. The 
California Innovations court, however, decided that Congress did 
just the opposite. It held that, without touching any of the words in 
the phrase “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive,” 
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Congress added a materiality requirement to the PGDM standard 
that rendered it identical to the standard for Section 2(a) 
deceptiveness. Because marks deemed deceptive under Section 
2(a) were already banned, the net effect was to render immediately 
registrable all geographically misdescriptive marks that had 
previously been subject to a secondary meaning test.  
As an exercise in statutory interpretation, the California 
Innovations opinion is strained. As Professor Mary La France has 
pointed out, the opinion’s approach violates conventional canons of 
statutory construction and attributes to Congress an almost 
irrational purpose in adjusting the statute after the ratification of 
NAFTA.171 We think that the most defensible interpretation of the 
NAFTA Implementation Act is that Congress endorsed PGDM 
precedent as it existed in 1993. In other words, whatever the 
PGDM standard ideally should have been in 1993, federal court 
precedent at that time in fact used a “maximalist” subjective test 
that placed a substantial burden on whoever wanted to 
demonstrate a goods-place association. Congress endorsed that 
approach when it amended Section 2(e) without disapproving of 
that interpretation; it simply changed the consequences of a 
mark’s falling into that category without changing the criteria of 
the category at all. 
Unlike the California Innovations holding, this interpretation 
would not incorporate a materiality test, but neither would it be as 
broad as the objective approach we advocate above. Such a result, 
however, continues to be unsatisfying. It underprotects competitor 
need by failing to incorporate an objective test, and leaves no room 
for an intermediate category requiring proof of secondary meaning. 
To make any more progress, we would need to enter the legislative 
arena, yet Congress is constrained by NAFTA and TRIPS. Do 
those constraints give it room to improve the current situation? In 
the next section, we argue that they do.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. See LaFrance, supra note 6, at 144-47. As LaFrance points out, the NAFTA 
Implementation Act provided for grandfathering of PGDM marks that became distinctive 
before December 8, 1993, see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), which, if PGDM marks are deceptive, 
violates a basic principle of trademark law, that deceptive marks never become distinctive. 
See id. at 145-46. Another clue that Congress did not intend PGDM marks to be a mere 
subset of deceptive marks is the remaining difference between these two categories with 
respect to availability of cancellation proceedings and incontestability. A petition to cancel a 
registration on grounds of deceptiveness under Section 2(a) can be brought at any time, and 
it is not affected by the general limitation on such actions to within five years after 
registration, or the status of a right to use the mark as being “incontestable.” Conversely, a 
petition to cancel a registration on the ground that the mark is “primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive” is subject to the five-year limitation, and is subject to dismissal 
if the mark has attained an incontestable right to use status. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 1065. 
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B. What the NAFTA and TRIPS Provisions on 
Geographical Indications Require  
What do NAFTA and TRIPS require? Luckily, we can consider 
the two treaties together, because the language of their general 
provisions on geographical indications is substantially identical, 
although TRIPS has special provisions concerning wines and 
spirits that NAFTA lacks. Our conclusion is that these provisions 
establish two hurdles for protection under a NAFTA- or TRIPS-
compliant law.172 The first is a subjective goods-place association 
test, which we will argue is a “minimalist” version of that test. The 
second test asks whether the geographic origin of the good 
designated by the mark in question either demonstrably 
contributes particular attributes to that type of good, or has a 
reputation for that type of good. We also conclude that the NAFTA 
and TRIPS provisions concern only goods, and do not require 
protection of geographical indications for services.  
The operative provisions of both treaties are concerned with 
uses of geographic terms or devices that “mislea[d] the public” 
about the geographic origin of goods.173 That language suggests a 
subjective approach, asking whether members of the public will be 
led to believe that a product comes from some place it does not.174 
If a use is deemed misleading as to geographic origin, nations that 
are parties to the treaties have two obligations. First, if the user 
seeks to register or has registered the designation, signatory 
nations must refuse or invalidate the registration.175 Second, 
signatory nations must also allow interested private parties to 
bring legal actions to prevent the use of the designation, regardless 
of whether it is registered.176 Thus, under a NAFTA- or TRIPS-
compliant law, a misleading use is both denied registration and 
subject to being enjoined in a private legal action. 
Professor LaFrance has argued that the treaty language 
expresses not just a subjective approach, but also a materiality 
standard that would allow Congress to adopt by further legislation 
the approach that California Innovations adopted by 
reinterpreting existing legislation. She notes that the treaty 
proscribes “misleading” geographic marks, and argues that a mark 
is not necessarily misleading if it does not motivate the purchasing 
decision—in other words, if it is not material. She also contends 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. By “NAFTA- or TRIPS-compliant law,” we mean a minimally compliant law—one 
that protects as much as required by NAFTA and TRIPS, but no more. 
 173. See NAFTA Arts. 1712(1)(a), 1712(2); TRIPS Arts. 22(2)(a), 22(3). 
 174. We address below whether this subjective approach is “perfectionist,” “maximalist,” 
or “minimalist,” in the sense those terms were defined above. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 175. See NAFTA Art. 1712(2); TRIPS Art. 22(3). 
 176. See NAFTA Art. 1712(1)(a); TRIPS Art. 22(2)(a). 
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that once a misdescriptive geographic mark has achieved 
secondary meaning, consumers can no longer be confused or misled 
by the mark.177 Based on these contentions, she concludes that 
Congress could modify the Lanham Act to forbid only those 
misdescriptive geographic marks that influence purchasers. 
We have three problems with this analysis. The first concerns 
what we think is the plain language of the operative treaty 
provisions themselves. That language speaks of consumers’ being 
misled as to the geographic origin of the goods, not consumers’ 
being “misled” in the abstract. If a mark provides inaccurate 
geographic information, it would seem that, by definition, it 
misleads consumers as to the origin of the goods, even if consumers 
are indifferent about the information. To use a variation on one of 
Professor LaFrance’s examples,178 imagine that the two authors of 
this article set up a stand at the Washington-Dulles Airport to sell 
root beer we made in Washington, D.C., but branded as CHICAGO 
root beer, and that we decorated the stand with a big picture of the 
skyline of Chicago, affected Chicago accents, and wore shirts and 
hats with the emblems of Chicago sports teams. We would 
probably lead many passersby to believe that the root beer was 
made in Chicago. Even if many of those passersby were not 
interested in buying root beer and never did, and others bought 
the root beer but did not care whether it was made in Chicago or 
not, we still would have managed to mislead them as to the 
geographic origin of the root beer. 
Second, to interpret the geographical indications provisions in 
NAFTA as containing a materiality requirement would also seem 
to render one of those provisions superfluous, in the same way that 
the California Innovations court’s interpretation of Section 2(e)(3) 
renders that section superfluous. NAFTA contains another 
provision, Article 1708(14), which is virtually identical to the first 
clause of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. In pertinent part, it 
requires NAFTA parties to refuse registration of “trademarks that 
consist of or comprise . . . deceptive . . . matter.” Thus, if Article 
1712(2) of NAFTA, which specifically addresses the registration of 
trademarks consisting of or comprising geographical indications, 
does nothing more than ban registration of geographically 
deceptive marks, there is no reason to include it in NAFTA at all, 
since Article 1708(14) already bans registration of deceptive 
marks, of which geographically deceptive marks are just a 
subset.179 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. See LaFrance, supra note 6, at 134-35, 138. 
 178. Id. at 134-35.  
 179. Unlike NAFTA, TRIPS does not contain a general provision banning registration of 
deceptive trademarks. 
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However, the third and most important reason to conclude 
that NAFTA and TRIPS do not include a materiality requirement 
is that they contain an additional, carefully crafted test that is 
clearly an alternative to a materiality requirement. This test is 
contained in the treaties’ substantially identical definitions of the 
term “geographical indication.” The version in TRIPS provides: 
Geographical indications are, for the purposes of this 
Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating in 
the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that 
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.180 
Because the operative provisions of the NAFTA and TRIPS 
treaties create obligations only with respect to “geographical 
indications,” this definition creates a second test that must be 
satisfied in addition to the subjective “misleading the public” test 
established in the operative provisions themselves. That is because 
not all geographic marks are “geographical indications” within the 
meaning of the treaty. In other words, nations that are parties to 
NAFTA and TRIPS must ban181 a use of a geographic term or 
device for a good only when both of the following requirements are 
satisfied: 
(1) The use leads the public to believe that the good in 
question came from place A, when in fact it came from 
Place B; and 
(2) The use is use as a “geographical indication,” which means 
either  
(a) Goods of the type in question that do, in fact, come 
from Place A have distinctive characteristics that can 
be attributed to their origin in Place A, or 
(b) Place A has a reputation for goods of the type in 
question.  
This second requirement is a significant additional hurdle to 
gaining protection under a NAFTA- and TRIPS-compliant law. We 
will first explain in greater detail the components of that 
requirement, and then explain its relation to a materiality test, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. TRIPS, Art. 22(1) (emphasis added). The NAFTA version provides: “[G]eographical 
indication means any indication that identifies a good as originating in the territory of a 
Party, or a region or locality in that territory, where a particular quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” NAFTA Art. 
1721.  
 181. We use this term as shorthand for the dual obligations to refuse to register a 
misleading geographical indication and to allow private parties to seek an injunction 
against misleading geographical indications.  
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and how we think it affects interpretation of the first “mislead the 
public” requirement. 
The NAFTA and TRIPS definitions require that “a . . . quality, 
reputation or other characteristic” of a good be attributable to the 
place that the mark designates as the origin of the good. We might 
call this requirement the “origin nexus” requirement. The nexus, 
or connection, between the goods and their place of origin can be 
either objective or subjective. The objective origin nexus is the 
connection of a “quality . . . or other characteristic” of goods to a 
place; the subjective nexus is the connection of the “reputation” of 
goods to a place.  
Consider, first, what it means for a “quality . . . or other 
characteristic” of a good to be “essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.” The most simple example is an agricultural 
product that has certain physical attributes because it was grown 
under the environmental conditions present in a particular area, 
such as soil type, temperature, rainfall, and so on. Although this 
example involves natural factors that make an agricultural 
product distinctive, the NAFTA and TRIPS definitions are best 
read to include human factors and manufactured goods as well.182 
In fact, a combination of place-specific natural and human 
factors is often at work with both agricultural and manufactured 
products. With respect to agricultural products, much depends 
upon the choices people make in response to the natural factors, 
such as the choice of what crop and variety to grow, how to till and 
fertilize the soil, how to harvest and preserve the crops, and so on. 
As for manufactured products, all manufactured products 
ultimately depend on natural resources of some kind, and a 
manufacturing location may be chosen because of its proximity to 
distinctive resources. For example, one distributor of Italian 
pottery claims, “Most of the ceramic villages [which are the source 
of this distributor’s wares] are located along the riverbanks where 
there are natural clay deposits and this clay makes the product 
special and of finer quality then other kind[s] of ceramics.”183 In 
addition, many manufactured products may well gain distinctive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. Some commentators have noted that the NAFTA and TRIPS definitions do not 
explicitly mention the inclusion of both “natural and human factors,” unlike the Lisbon 
Agreement and the WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Appellations of Origin 
and Indications of Source. See Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Origins in 
the TRIPS Agreement, 86 TMR 11, 31-32 (1996); Lee Bendekgey & Caroline H. Mead, 
International Protection of Appellations of Origin and Other Geographic Indications, 82 
TMR 765, 785 (1992). However, the language of those definitions seems broad enough to 
encompass human factors as well as natural ones, as other commentators have recognized. 
See Bernard O’Connor, The Law of Geographical Indications 54 (2004). 
 183. A Brief History of the Art of Majolica, http://www.tasteofflorence.com/ History.htm 
(visited January 30, 2006). 
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features from a local craft tradition or a local community of 
technical expertise. 
In some cases, all of these elements are at work. For example, 
in 1899, a successful lawsuit was brought by seven flour mills in 
Minneapolis against a Chicago company that was marking its flour 
“Minneapolis, Minnesota” or “Minnesota Patent.” The evidence 
revealed that the flour mills in Minneapolis all used hard spring 
wheat grown in Minnesota and North Dakota. It also 
demonstrated that they also all used a particular milling process, 
called “roller grinding,” that was particularly adapted to hard 
spring wheat and was designed to preserve as much of the flour 
gluten as possible.184  
We expect, however, that the facts of many cases involving 
manufactured goods would not reveal an objective origin nexus. 
Inexpensive transportation of raw materials has drastically 
reduced the need for many producers to be located near their raw 
material sources, and methods of refinement and chemical 
synthesis have made the original place-specific characteristics of 
raw materials less important to finished products. For example, 
the chemical composition of oil may vary between oil fields, but by 
the time the oil is made into polyethylene and delivered to a firm 
thousands of miles away that molds polyethylene into a consumer 
product, those variances are no longer traceable. This is why, as 
Justin Hughes remarked, “[F]or all practical purposes, the law of 
geographical indications is about foodstuffs.”185 
 Whether a type of good gains “a given quality . . . or other 
characteristic” from the place it originates is, we submit, an 
objective test in the sense that it does not matter whether the 
connection is famous or completely unknown to the general public, 
so long as someone can demonstrate that connection. “Quality” is 
preceded by the indefinite article “a” and the adjective “given” (or 
“particular” in NAFTA), which suggests reference to a particular 
attribute of the good, not to the fact that the good is reputed to be 
of superior make or growth. The catch-all “other characteristics” 
also suggests an objective test, because it refers to features of the 
good independent of its current reputation. 
“Reputation,” on the other hand, which is the term that fills in 
the ellipsis in “a given quality . . . or other characteristic,” is a 
subjective matter, since it requires public knowledge of the 
connection between good and place. However, it is different than 
the subjective goods-place association test contained in the phrase 
“mislead the public” in the treaties’ operative provisions. To be 
misled into thinking that some root beer came from Chicago, one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. See Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 86 F. 608 (7th Cir. 1898). 
 185. See Hughes, supra note 88. 
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does not necessarily have to know that Chicago has a reputation 
for root beer. The combination of signals employed in our 
hypothetical Dulles Airport root beer stand should mislead people 
even though they do not know that Chicago has a reputation for 
root beer (in fact, as far as we know, it does not).186 Thus, 
“reputation” requires something more. It requires that a place be 
well known, or famous, for the goods in question. Thus, in sum, to 
satisfy the second “origin nexus” requirement for protection under 
a NAFTA- or TRIPS-compliant law, one needs to show either that 
the purported place of origin contributes some distinctive 
characteristic to the type of goods in question, or that it is well 
known for those goods. 
What relationship does this requirement of an origin nexus 
have to a materiality test? It is not a materiality test. One does not 
need to show that the origin of the goods would influence the 
purchasing decisions of consumers. It is, however, a step in that 
direction. One has to show that goods that actually come from the 
place in question have distinctive qualities or a known reputation, 
matters that could influence a rational consumer’s decision to 
purchase. However, to go one step further and require one to show 
that these differences would influence purchase decisions is, we 
think, to ignore exactly where the treaties chose to stop.  
Moreover, one can imagine good reasons that the treaties 
chose to stop where they did. First, the materiality test requires 
either an expensive and manipulable survey or a guess to 
determine what would, in fact, influence consumers. Second, the 
objective origin nexus test gives some “breathing room” to protect a 
nascent reputation. If goods that come from some place are, in fact, 
different, but do not yet have a reputation for that difference, the 
objective test assures that the possibility of gaining a reputation is 
not prematurely cut off.  
The first requirement for protection under the NAFTA and 
TRIPS treaties—the “mislead the public” test imposed by the 
operative provisions—is a subjective test, but in the terms we have 
defined above,187 is it “maximalist,” “perfectionist,” or 
“minimalist”? Reading the operative provisions in light of the 
definition of “geographical indications,” we would argue that it is a 
minimalist test. A maximalist interpretation would essentially 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. In the language of the treaties, “Chicago” is not a geographical indication for root 
beer, because root beer does not derive special qualities from being made in that city, nor 
does that city have a reputation for fine root beer. Since that toponym is not a geographical 
indication, the treaty imposes no obligations on member states to regulate its use in any 
particular way. Thus, the United States would be free to allow protection from the time of 
first adoption to ban the use of such a mark or to defer protection until the user could show 
secondary meaning. As the analysis in the text indicates, we believe the choice should turn 
on the objective question of whether there are other root beer vendors in Chicago. 
 187. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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duplicate the “reputation” component of the second hurdle, while 
rendering the objective “quality . . . or other characteristic” 
component inoperative. In other words, if a mark “misleads the 
public” as to geographic origin only when a majority of the public 
affirmatively associates the goods with the place, that is almost 
certainly because the place has a reputation for the goods, and 
there would be no room left for the objective component to operate. 
We think the perfectionist interpretation is unworkable in any 
case, but in addition, it too would give too little a role for the 
objective component of the second hurdle. Only with a minimalist 
interpretation would the objective component have a chance to 
make a significant difference, as it was surely intended to. 
Under a minimalist subjective test, marks using geographic 
terms are likely neither descriptive nor misdescriptive in three 
situations. The first is when the term is not generally recognized 
by the public as the name of a place, because the place is too 
obscure. The second is when it would be impossible, or virtually 
impossible, for the goods in question to come from the place. The 
third is when the mark is a composite mark, and, considered as a 
whole, is clearly using the geographic term in a metaphorical 
rather than a literal sense. In all other cases, the mark is 
misleading in the sense that the public is not able to exclude the 
possibility that the mark is conveying information about 
geographic origin, and yet that information is inaccurate.  
Last, the NAFTA and TRIPS obligations with respect to 
geographical indications are limited in one more important way: 
they apply only to goods, and not to services. NAFTA and TRIPS 
both liberally link the term “goods” with the term “services” when 
they mean to include both,188 so the absence of any reference to 
services in the geographical indications provisions is telling. One 
other provision in NAFTA, the Article 1708(14) provision, that 
requires the parties to refuse to register “trademarks that consist 
of or comprise . . . deceptive . . . matter,”189 does include 
geographically deceptive service marks.190 TRIPS contains no such 
provision, and arguably contains no provision at all, requiring 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. See, e.g., NAFTA Art. 1708(1) (“[A] trademark consists of any sign . . . capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of any person from those of another. . . .”); TRIPS Art. 
15 (“Any sign . . . capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark.”); see also Daniel 
Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 191 (2d ed. 2003) (TRIPS 
Article 22 does not apply to services because “[i]t seems that where negotiators wanted to 
indicate that a rule in respect of indications applied to services as well as goods, they said 
so.”); O’Connor, supra note 182, at 53 (TRIPS Article 22 does not apply to services). 
 189. NAFTA Art. 1708(14). 
 190. See NAFTA Art. 1708(1) (“Trademarks shall include service marks. . . .”). 
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protection for indications of origin of services.191 Thus, any 
regulation of geographical indication uses under NAFTA that are 
not “deceptive” within the meaning of Article 1708(14), and any 
regulation of geographical indication uses in TRIPS at all, apply 
only to uses in connection with goods.  
C. What Congress Could Do to Restore the Role of 
Competitor Communication and Secondary Meaning 
in Light of NAFTA and TRIPS 
What did Congress have to do to comply with the NAFTA and 
TRIPS provisions on geographical indications? It did not have to 
permanently bar registration of all marks that create an 
inaccurate goods-place association, as we believe the NAFTA 
Implementation Act is best interpreted to have done. On the other 
hand, Congress did need to do more than bar registration of marks 
that materially misrepresented geographic origin, as the 
California Innovations court interpreted the NAFTA 
Implementation Act to have done.192  
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. One might think that the NAFTA and TRIPS incorporation of the Paris Convention 
could impose an obligation to protect against the use of false indications of origin with 
respect to both goods and services. After all, Article 10bis of the Paris Convention requires 
effective protection against unfair competition, including “any act of competition contrary to 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters,” Paris Convention Art. 10bis(2), a 
phrase abstract enough that it could arguably include the use of false geographical 
indications. However, the legislative history of Article 10bis shows that the United States 
objected to the inclusion of geographic origins in the Article and an explicit reference to 
“origin” was struck, casting serious doubt on whether that Article imposes any requirements 
respecting indications of origin. See Conrad, supra note 182, at 24-25. NAFTA and TRIPS 
then both extend Article 10bis to geographical indications, see NAFTA Art. 1712(1)(b); 
TRIPS Art. 22(2)(b), but because they both define geographic origins as being limited to 
goods, that obligation must also be so limited.  
Article 10 of the Paris Convention, in conjunction with Article 9, more directly 
requires parties to seize goods at the border when a false indication of geographic source has 
been directly or indirectly used in connection with them. However, these provisions clearly 
do not apply to services, and in any case, two commentators have suggested that “it was 
expressly understood that these words were to be interpreted as a mere invitation of 
member States to adopt legislation . . . but that this invitation would not create any 
obligation, not even a moral one.” G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 137 (1969); see Daniel Gervais, The 
TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 193 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting Bodenhausen). 
The provisions of U.S. law that may be traceable to Article 10, Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 
592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730 (1905), and Lanham Act § 42, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, seem to have 
generated relatively little litigation.  
 192. As we have noted, NAFTA and TRIPS also contain private action requirements. See 
NAFTA Art. 1712(1)(a); TRIPS Art. 22(2)(a). The only federal law that would arguably meet 
these requirements is Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), 
which provides for an action for misrepresentation of geographic origin. Courts have 
generally held that actions under Section 43(a) require a demonstration that the 
misrepresentation in question is material, that is, would have an effect on consumer 
purchase decisions. See, e.g., William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, 66 F.3d 255 (9th Cir. 1995); 
4 McCarthy, supra note 6, § 27:35. We argue above that the NAFTA and TRIPS definitions 
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Ideally, we submit, the Lanham Act should contain a 
permanent bar against the registration of geographic marks that 
tracks the minimum NAFTA and TRIPS requirements. Thus, a 
mark would be permanently barred from registration if: 
(1) it created an inaccurate goods-place association, under the 
minimalist interpretation of that test; and  
(2) at least one of the following conditions was satisfied:  
(a) goods of the type in question that come from the 
purported place of origin have distinctive 
characteristics that can be attributed to their origin in 
that place; or 
(b) the purported place of origin has a reputation for goods 
of the type in question. 
This permanent bar leaves sufficient room for an intermediate 
category of geographically descriptive and misdescriptive marks 
that should not and need not be permanently barred, but would 
require secondary meaning for registration. A mark would fall into 
this intermediate category if:  
(1) the mark created either an accurate or an inaccurate 
goods-place association, under a minimalist interpretation 
of that test; and 
(2) there were other merchants located in the place designated 
by the mark producing or selling the same type of good. 
As a procedural matter, once the trademark examining 
attorney demonstrated that the first condition was satisfied, we 
would place the burden on the applicant to show that the second 
condition was not satisfied. We suggest this because we think that 
typically the applicant will be more likely to have access to the 
relevant information. Marks that met neither the conditions for 
the permanent bar nor the conditions for the intermediate category 
would be immediately registrable. 
There is one final factor that we think counsels moving to our 
suggested approach, above. An inevitable hazard of any regime of 
intellectual property rights is that firms will attempt to use it to 
obtain advantages unrelated to their competitive merits and to 
hinder their rivals. This is a particular risk with trademarks, 
because appropriating key words can leave rivals speechless. 
Moreover, strangers to an industry, such as trademark examining 
attorneys, judges, and law professors, can never know as much 
                                                                                                                                         
 
of “geographical indication” fall somewhat short of requiring materiality. See supra 
Part IV.B. Thus, in theory, the Lanham Act might not quite comply in this respect with 
NAFTA and TRIPS standards, although this discrepancy could possibly be cured by judicial 
reinterpretation of Section 43(a)(1)(B), since the materiality requirement is not stated 
explicitly in the language of that provision.  
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about what words are crucial components of competitive 
communication as those who are engaged in the trade. We think 
that the refinements we have suggested above will tend to reduce 
the risk of rent-seeking behavior by early adopters of geographic 
trademarks and better ensure that every firm has access to the full 
range of useful communicative tools. That, in turn, should enable 
consumers to better identify substitute products, promote more 
price competition, and enhance consumer welfare. 
We now conclude by hazarding some guesses about how 
several types of uses would come out under these rules, including 
both decided cases and a few typical categories of uses.  
NEW YORK WAYS GALLERY and THE VENICE 
COLLECTION.193 Because there was evidence that New York has 
a reputation for leather goods, the NEW YORK WAYS GALLERY 
mark for leather goods not made in New York would be 
permanently barred from registration. In the jargon of the treaties, 
“New York” is a “geographical indication” for leather goods. Using 
“New York” on goods made elsewhere would mislead consumers as 
to the geographic origin of those goods. Thus, to describe leather 
goods not from New York with this particular geographical 
designation is to run afoul of the absolute prohibition of the 
treaties. The addition of the words “ways” and “gallery” would not 
alter the result because, although they do make the trademark a 
composite mark, their addition does not render the reference to 
New York merely incidental or metaphorical. 
We arrive at the same conclusion for the mark THE VENICE 
COLLECTION for glass, lace, art objects, jewelry, textiles, and 
printed works not coming from Venice, since Venice is famous for 
those things. In this case, however, it is not as clear that the scope 
of the “related goods” rule should be quite as broad as the court 
held in In re Save Venice New York. The court there held, for 
example, that use of the mark on “tableware made with precious 
metals” was sufficiently related to Venice’s reputation for “art 
objects” to create a goods-place association. Here, the issue is 
whether Venice’s reputation for “art objects” or objets d’art—a 
rather broad and vague category—should result in a permanent 
bar for the mark THE VENICE COLLECTION for tableware not 
made in Venice. Although the scope of a locale’s preclusive 
reputation would have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis, we 
think it is at least possible that Venice’s reputation for nothing 
more specific than “art objects” should not result in such a 
permanent bar.  
NANTUCKET for shirts. The mark NANTUCKET for shirts 
not made on Nantucket Island would probably not be permanently 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. See supra note 66. 
Vol. 96 TMR 845 
 
barred. As far as we know, there is no evidence that shirts coming 
from Nantucket Island (if indeed there are any) have any 
distinctive qualities stemming from their geographic origin, or that 
Nantucket Island has a reputation for shirts. NANTUCKET, 
however, refers to a place generally known by the American public, 
from which it would not be impossible for shirts to come (that is, 
there is a minimalist subjective goods-place association here), and 
it appears that there are companies selling shirts on Nantucket 
Island (that is, there is an objective reason to think competitors 
could conceivably want or need the geographical designation). That 
would suggest that the mark should be registered only upon proof 
of secondary meaning. If, however, the applicant could show that 
there are no competitors on Nantucket Island, there would be no 
need to delay a grant of exclusive rights. Secondary meaning could 
be dispensed with, the mark could be deemed literally suggestive, 
and registration could be granted immediately.  
CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS for beverage containers. The 
mark CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS for insulated beverage 
containers not made in California would probably also not be 
permanently barred, and certainly not, as far as we know, on the 
basis of any origin nexus. However, the second word in the 
composite, “innovations,” does suggest some cases in which a 
composite might actually be more likely to invoke a place’s 
reputation and thus raise the possibility of a permanent bar. 
SILICON VALLEY for insulated beverage containers is one thing, 
but SILICON VALLEY HIGH TECHNOLOGY ENGINEERING 
for insulated beverage containers is another. The latter would 
seem to suggest quite specifically that the design or construction of 
the container involved the expertise of engineers in Silicon Valley. 
Silicon Valley’s engineers are generally known for expertise in 
semiconductors and the Internet, and not insulated beverage 
containers, but the composite mark suggests a link to those skills, 
and hence might be permanently barred as invoking a Silicon 
Valley reputation. 
CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS for insulated beverage 
containers does create a minimal goods-place association, and so 
the issue would be whether there are competitors in California 
that make such a product. The evidence mentioned in the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion suggests that there were not, though that 
evidence seems rather counterintuitive given that the state has a 
gross product of about $1.5 trillion, making its economy bigger 
than that of Italy, Canada, or Spain.194 It is hard to believe that 
there is only one insulated beverage container maker in the state, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See http://www.lao.ca.gov/2004/cal_facts/2004_calfacts_econ.htm (visited March 23, 
2006). 
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unless the containers involved are covered by patents. 
Nonetheless, if the registration applicant could prove such a fact, 
the mark could be immediately registered. Of course, even if the 
mark is immediately registered, it is still subject to a descriptive 
fair use defense, and one would expect that such a defense would 
be interpreted at least somewhat generously when the alleged 
infringer is located in California and the mark holder is not. 
THE REGIONAL CUISINE RESTAURANT. It is not a matter 
of chance that a large number of cases about trademark protection 
for geographic brand names involve restaurants. There are a 
number of phenomena involving restaurants that push consumer 
perceptions in different directions, and that therefore lead to tricky 
cases under the dominant subjective approach. On one hand, it 
turns out that there are many traditional regional cuisines, 
domestic and foreign, that have become successful themes of 
restaurants well outside those regions, and in some cases, on the 
other side of the world. As we have noted, a strong tradition has 
developed of using place names from those regions as restaurant 
names to suggest the regional cuisine being served at the 
restaurant.195 Some of those uses would, under a subjective 
service-place association test, be found to generate no expectation 
among consumers that any aspect of the restaurant originated in 
the place from which it took its name, other than some of its 
recipes. On the other hand, restaurants are not pure service 
businesses; they provide goods, in the form of food and drink. In 
some cases, the name of a restaurant might convince consumers 
that a principal ingredient in the meals came from a particular 
place. A patron of the COLORADO STEAKHOUSE restaurant, for 
example, might be convinced that the beef served there came from 
Colorado.196  
Under our analysis, geographic names of restaurants, like 
other geographic brands, are unstable, and therefore susceptible to 
both literal claim-of-origin and metaphorical understandings. 
Thus, the important question will often be whether there are 
competitors who may want to use the geographic term in its literal 
sense to indicate origin, regardless of whether many consumers 
might currently understand the use as metaphorical. If so, then 
the use should be subject to a secondary meaning requirement. 
In the case of restaurants, an important limitation is that the 
competitors must be doing business in the United States. It is 
irrelevant to trademark protection and registration under U.S. law 
that there are restaurants in China that would like to use the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 196. See In re Consolidated Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1921 (T.T.A.B. 
2004) (upholding a refusal to register the mark COLORADO STEAKHOUSE for restaurant 
services as PGDM for restaurants located in Indiana). 
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word “Shanghai” to describe their location. The question is 
whether there are restaurants doing business in the United States 
that would like to indicate that they are owned or licensed by 
companies based in Shanghai, China, or perhaps that their 
ingredients all come from Shanghai. We think that the answer for 
most foreign place names is likely to be in the negative because of 
the structure of the restaurant industry and the way restaurants 
conduct their business.197 There are foreign restaurants with 
branches in the United States, but there are very few of them, and 
although restaurants may import certain specialty ingredients, 
they are unlikely to import the bulk of their food from a single 
foreign location. Although there is bound to be some disagreement 
over exactly how substantial a restaurant’s connection to a place 
must be for that place to count as the restaurant’s origin, we 
submit that most other connections would be too tenuous.  
THE NEIGHBORHOOD STORE. It is quite likely that the 
vast majority of businesses in the United States that use 
toponymical brand names are neighborhood dry cleaners, flower 
shops, banks, liquor stores, real estate agents, beauty salons, and 
the like, which adopt the name of the street on which they are 
located, or of their neighborhood or town, or of a local river, 
mountain, or other geographic feature. These businesses typically 
never seek federal registration because they are so small that the 
cost of registration would be a substantial expense for them and 
because they are not seeking to build a national brand. These 
geographic term uses are unlikely to be permanently barred, under 
either current federal law or our ideal law, but they should 
obviously be given trademark protection only after a showing of 
secondary meaning. 
In addition, there may be some circumstances in which the 
statutory presumption of secondary meaning after five years of 
exclusive use198 might be overcome by local circumstances. 
Suppose, for example, that a newly developed suburb was at first 
only large enough to support a single flower shop, and that flower 
shop took the name of the suburb. Suppose further that another 
florist arrived six or seven years later when the suburb had grown 
larger and also wanted to incorporate the suburb’s name into its 
own brand name. Whether one views secondary meaning solely 
from a consumer perception perspective, or also views it as a kind 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. The situation may be different in the hotel industry. There are many international 
hotel chains, and some of them might well want to indicate that they are owned by 
companies from particular countries. Thus, “Swissotel” for hotel services is registered only 
in stylized form, see U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1245638 (issued July 12, 1983); there 
might be good reason for demanding secondary meaning before issuing a registration for the 
word mark itself. 
 198. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
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of laches doctrine for competitors, a court might decide that the 
first flower shop could not show secondary meaning. Consumers 
may not have paid much attention to its name as a brand name 
when it was the only flower shop in town, and the new shop 
certainly had no opportunity to prevent secondary meaning from 
forming through its own use of the suburb’s name. We suspect, 
however, that in practice most second-comers just choose a 
different name because, even if they want their brands to indicate 
convenience and membership in the local community, there are in 
most areas multiple local names available: if not the town, then a 
prominent street or river.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The development of the goods-place association test, with its 
focus on subjective consumer perception, has led the law of 
geographic trademarks to stray from its traditional goal of 
protecting the communicative needs of competitors. Because of the 
uncertainty and instability of consumer understandings of 
geographic term uses, current consumer perception of a trademark 
registration applicant’s use is likely to be extremely difficult to 
ascertain, and unlikely to be a good indicator of whether multiple 
firms might need access to the place name to signal product 
equivalence. The proper focus is not on the applicant, but on the 
applicant’s competitors. Could competitors use the applicant’s 
geographic term in such a way that consumers would understand 
it as describing their location? If so, then the applicant should be 
put to the “market test” of secondary meaning before obtaining 
trademark protection and a registration for the use. 
Although this approach could have been fully implemented 
before 1993 by administrative and judicial interpretation alone, it 
no longer can because the NAFTA Implementation Act 
permanently barred all “geographically deceptively misdescriptive” 
marks. That permanent bar foreclosed any role for secondary 
meaning, and led the Federal Circuit to focus more tightly on 
materiality and consumer deception as a prerequisite to falling 
under that bar. Under the most plausible interpretation of the 
NAFTA Implementation Act, the permanent bar extends further 
and encompasses all uses creating a goods-place association under 
a maximalist version of that test. However, NAFTA and TRIPS do 
not require such a result. They require a permanent bar only when 
the place named by the toponym in question demonstrably 
contributes some quality to the goods in question, or when it has a 
reputation for those goods. That bar does not alone adequately 
protect the communicative needs of competitors, but it leaves room 
for the secondary meaning test described above to be triggered 
when the applicant fails to prove that there are no competitors in 
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the place named by the geographic term that might need to use it 
to describe their location. Such a test would return the law of 
geographic descriptiveness to its traditional goal of protecting the 
communicative needs of competitors, thereby enhancing 
competition and ultimately benefiting consumers.  
 
